


Balagha



African Rhetoric Quarterly

ISSN 2074-1448 July-September 2011 Volume 1 Number 4



Conference Report
Articles
News
AAR Book Project
New Publications
Orations
Poetry

Balagha is a KiSwahili/Arabic word for 'eloquence': the closest in meaning to the idea of rhetoric. This quarterly publication deals with a variety of themes and cover relevant events.

Balagha publishes reviews, commentaries, speeches, short articles and reports on events that are considered to have rhetorical importance. Submissions are welcome from potential contributors. Articles submitted to *Balagha* should not be more than 1, 500 words in length.

This fourth issue will attempt to look at the theme of rhetorical leadership and Inter-culturalism. This is deemed necessary in line with the theme of Association's conference that was recently held at the Southern Sun Hotel, Newlands, Cape Town.

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Balagha



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From the Editor's Desk




Dr Segun Ige

This year's conference entitled: *Intercultural-Negotiation of the Global Space: African Perspectives*, did not come without its apprehension. Partly because the organizers did not secure enough funding and support that they had hoped and sought for, and partly because of other exogenous factors that were beyond their control. In spite of lack of support, the conference was held at a decent location with a scholarly ambience and polite hospitality crew, and attended by seasoned scholars from Africa and beyond who presented papers on rhetoric and Inter-culturalism. The two day conference considered issues relating to media and rhetoric, nation building and rhetorical leadership, speech-writing and children's and organizational rhetoric. The fundamental issue that emerged is that scholarship in rhetoric needs to exploit its architectonic qualities to intensify its integration into the different disciplines, educate policy makers and encourage its application in management and governance systems. A consolidated African rhetoric project can help in the much needed transformational process in African politics and socio-economic processes.

More importantly, the 2011 conference was a defining moment, not only for the conference series project, but also, for the Association since its membership and commitment are now assuming a tangible and concrete form. A number of scholars have committed themselves to supporting the Association's initiatives and also making proposal that can help grow it into a formidable scholarly organization on the continent. From rhetoric related research that have been conducted and publications that have been released on the continent, it behooves rhetoric scholars to find ways to promote scholarship in and practice of rhetoric beyond sectoral and ideological interests. While it is clear that higher education in Africa in particular is encountering numerous challenges that beg negative reaction from scholars, developing rhetoric as a discipline and as a noble vocation requires unflinching and unabated commitment and engagement by rhetorical scholars to ensure that a larger pool of critical mass is produced not only on the continent, but also, beyond Africa of individual scholars and groups who would like to associate with the African rhetoric project. In this edition of *Balagha*, we present you with conference report and Bond's article on Climate change and a short commentary on Goodluck Jonathan's inaugural address.

'My first problem lies of course in the very word rhetoric. I was tempted, as I have often been in the past, to define that slippery term once and for all, but I have resisted, even though to grapple with its ambiguities would illustrate beautifully why Ryerson lecturers are notoriously nervous nellies. Just how much time should a lecturer spend claiming that, like Humpty Dumpty, he is to be the boss of definitions. . . . Ted Schultz has recently advised me to abandon the sleazy term altogether and substitute something like "philosophy of discourse" or "theory of communication." But to abandon the term rhetoric, with its long, honorable history, just because it often suggests shoddy practices, would be like abandoning the term philosophy, just because people talk about the "the philosophy of tennis coaching," or abandoning the word science just because Mary Baker and the scientologists have each borrowed it for their purposes. Rather than defining it or abandoning it, suppose we just put a big question mark by whatever your own definition would now be. You may or may not, by the end, want to apply the term rhetorical study to what we will have been doing.'

Wayne Booth, 'The Idea of a University—as Seen by a Rhetorician' in Walter Jost (2006) (ed.) *Wayne Booth: The Essential*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: pp. 281-282.



AAR NEWS

2011 Conference News:



In order to complete the four part conference series which was intended to people the Association from different parts of Africa and beyond, the fourth conference will be held in 2013. The theme of this next conference will be *African Rhetoric (s), African Space (s)*. We hope that the fourth conference will in effect try to reflect a more diverse, multidisciplinary and cross-disciplinary engagement. One of the observations at the June conference was that papers leaned more toward political rhetoric. From the theme of the conference, we hope that interested scholars would find their disciplines catered for in the sub-themes that will be sent out in the call for papers. Professor Jairos Kangira, University of Namibia, has indicated his interest in hosting the 2013 conference in Namibia. Further consultation is required on this and final decisions will be communicated to members and interested scholars.

It was also suggested at the roundtable that national chapters of the African Association for Rhetoric be opened with possible headquarters on the continent. This also requires funding since a significant amount of travelling will be involved. Further to that is possible linkage with other international rhetoric organisations. Hopefully before the next conference, the association would have been further consolidated and better resourced to embark on this kind of expansion projects. A mailing list will be established to further interaction between and among members.

A concept paper for a Book Project was also distributed at the roundtable with a view to publishing a pivotal material that would support curriculum in research and teaching in African Rhetoric. Submissions are encouraged from interested scholars. [For further information please see pages 6-7].

African Journal of Rhetoric ISSN 1998-2054



The second issue of the journal has generated a lot of interest from individual scholars and institutions. This has been most encouraging. The third issue of the journal is expected to be published in September 2011.

Reviews for Volume 4 will commence in the coming months. Scholars who presented papers at the June conference are encouraged to send in their papers for refereeing having included corrections from the discussion sessions. Dr Ige can be contacted for further clarifications on this matter.



Balagha ISSN 2074-1448



Balagha continues to solicit for contributions from interested scholars. In future, we hope that *Balagha* will appear in print format and be widely circulated, not in its present format but as an upgraded journal. We will keep most of the submission fairly short and publish one or two long articles as the occasion demands. We may publish special editions of the *Balagha* for outside organisations who may want to support the Association. We would also like to showcase achievements of members of the Association in *Balagha*. For those who may want to announce their newly published books, events or other information worthy of dissemination, kindly contact the editor [ige.segun@gmail.com].

Submissions should be around 1500 words maximum, and should not include disciplinary jargons which will make the articles incomprehensible to an average reader.

Balagha is a supplementary journal to the African Journal of Rhetoric. For now, some articles that appear in *Balagha* may be reprinted in the AJR depending on the merit of these articles. We also welcome reviews of Books and conference news from interested scholars. Opinions contained in the articles that feature in *Balagha* are those of the authors and do not belong to the Association. We also invite responses to articles published in *Balagha*.



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 (Including postage)
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Volume 1 Volume 2

Email enquiries to: ajr@af rhet.org.za; ige.segun@gmail.com

URL: www.af rhet.org.za

Book Project: Concept Paper

BOOK TITLE: *A Companion to African Rhetoric*

NEED STATEMENT

African Rhetoric is gradually emerging as an important area of interest in the humanities and the social sciences. There are regional and continental organisations that have started promoting African Rhetoric not only as an academic discipline, but also as a social practice in politics and other aspects of social life. The African public sphere is as diverse as its rhetoric. The African Association for Rhetoric is taking the initiative to produce a fundamental reader or reference material in form of a compendium that will be used in teaching senior undergraduate and graduate students in African Rhetoric. The continuous neglect of a fundamental and pivotal publication to assist in teaching rhetoric, specifically, African rhetoric further emphasises the frustration encountered by scholars interested in teaching rhetoric, specifically, African Rhetoric. Designing a project of this magnitude certainly requires sensitivity to not only political, cultural, scholarly, methodological, scientific, economic, legal, medical, psychological, literary, social and deliberative applications, but also those relating to the material conditions of African peoples and Africans in the Diaspora. This proposed publication is intended to serve as one of the fundamental reference material in African Rhetoric: hence, the title, *A Companion to African Rhetoric*.

This Book Project will seek to secure from seasoned scholars with an interest in African Rhetoric contributions to an unprecedented compendium that hopefully will form the basis for scholarship and curriculum in African Rhetoric. This volume will be divided into three broad parts: History of Rhetoric, relevant theories and methodologies and contextual/situational discussions on rhetoric on the continent having disciplinary foci. Altogether there will be around thirty main chapters.

The need for this publication has arisen following recent development in rhetoric and the coordination effort of some scholars who seek to promote rhetoric on the African continent. It is further premised on the idea that before meaningful advancement can be made there is need for project that will lend definition to the study of rhetoric on the African continent and give direction to rhetoric curriculum.

AIM

The main aim of this project is to embark on a multidisciplinary definition and consolidation of African Rhetoric for the purposes of heightened research and scholarship in African Rhetoric.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the project are to:

1. Produce a multidisciplinary companion to African Rhetoric
2. Involve as many scholars with an interest in African rhetoric with the hope of continuous engagement with African Rhetoric
3. Establish a basis for the study of African Rhetoric through this landmark publication and the importance of rhetoric in all aspects of society

Content Outline

History of Rhetoric

1. Introduction: Rhetoric in Culture and Society
2. Classical Rhetoric and Reception in Africa
3. Rhetoric and Pluralism in Africa
4. African Rhetoric: Main Concepts
5. African Oral Tradition
6. The Philosophy of African Rhetoric
7. African Rhetoric in the 20th Century
8. Negotiating Africa
9. Rhetorical concerns about the Pan-Africanist Discourse

-
10. African Rhetoric in Diaspora
 11. African and African-American Rhetoric
 12. Rhetoric of Race and Identity in Africa
 13. Rhetoric, Power and the State in Africa
 14. The Renaissance Rhetoric in Africa

Theory / Methodology

15. Theoretical Issues in African Rhetoric
16. Methodological issues
17. Teaching African Rhetoric at Higher Institutions

Contextual / Disciplinary application of Rhetoric

18. Disciplining Rhetoric
19. Rhetoric in the Health Sciences
20. Rhetoric in African Politics
21. Rhetoric and Deliberation in Africa
22. Rhetoric and Symbolism in Africa
23. Rhetoric of Peace and Conflict in Africa
24. Diplomatic Rhetoric
25. Rhetoric and Development in Africa
26. Rhetoric in Media and Communication Sciences
27. Rhetoric and law in Africa
28. Rhetoric in African Organisations and Institutions
29. Gender and Rhetoric
30. Rhetoric and African Literature
31. Rhetoric and Presidential leadership
32. The Rhetoric of Social reform
33. Performing the African Rhetoric: Ethical Issues
34. Rhetoric and Religion in Africa

NB: Interested authors should not feel constrained to use the chapter titles suggested above. These are simply working titles.

Abstract: 350 words

Deadline: October 2011

Chapter: maximum 8000 words per chapter (excluding references)

Deadline: May 2012

Expected Total number of pages: 1200

Readership: Since it is intended to serve as a reference material, this volume will appeal mostly to University Libraries across the globe, rhetorical scholars in Africa and North America, and other institutions whose operations relate to rhetoric, and general readership.

Corresponding editor: Dr Segun Ige: ige.segun@gmail.com

This Book Project is an initiative of the African Association for Rhetoric (AAR).





AAR Membership/Journal Subscription Rates

Faculty Members: \$75 R540 (Free copy of the Journal, *Balagha*, and maintenance of the website)
Graduate Students: \$35 R350

Journal rates: Institutional subscription: Africa: R1800 International: \$400
Individual subscription: SA R200 Rest of Africa: R150 International \$35

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
What role would you like to play in the Association _____



Impoliteness in Context
 Negotiating Identities in a Multilingual and Multi-cultural African Context
 2011; ISBN 978-3844393576
 Lambert Academic Publishing. pp vi+ 251.
 Price: €79

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'This book is one of the earliest studies to investigate impoliteness within a multilingual and multicultural African Context. It makes significant contribution to the study of politeness and impoliteness by investigating and comparing the discourse of people of different African cultural and linguistic backgrounds who interact within a lingua franca, which is not culturally neutral. The study demonstrates that identity is core to the understanding of impoliteness and vice versa. This book should be of great interest to students and researchers in Linguistics, Gender and in a wide range of disciplines across humanities and social sciences. It is an excellent intervention into the field of politeness research and impoliteness research since there has not been a great deal written on impoliteness outside the context of English, and also a dearth of research of politeness relating to African Languages.'

Professor Sara Mills, Humanities Research Centre, University of Sheffield, UK

Rapporteur's Notes: AAR 2011

NEWLANDS FOREST 1

African
Association
For Rhetoric

The African Association for Rhetoric (AAR) held its two day international biennial conference at the Southern Sun Hotel, Newlands, Cape Town between 30 June and 1 July 2011. The programme was modified to accommodate an excursion to Bowler's Bay and Cape Point. A short discussion session was held at the Gala dinner about how to advance the project.



The conference was declared open by the Coordinator of the project, Dr Segun Ige, who gave a brief history of the Association and its journey since 2007 when it was inaugurated at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. He highlighted the main components of the project, namely, the conference series and the two publications, *African Journal of Rhetoric* and *Balagha: African Rhetoric Quarterly*. Following is a summary of presentations at the conference.

Professor Pieter Fourie, UNISA

Professor Pieter Fourie, an eminent Professor of Media Studies and Editor of *Communicatio*, a journal that focuses on media and communication presented the first Keynote address at the conference. In his paper entitled: *Normative Theory as a Cornerstone for Media Practice and Policy: The Case for Ubuntuism*, Professor Fourie asserts that it is critical to understand the current tension between government and the media through normative media theory. He identifies three main *loci* of tension: media tribunal,

Protection of Information Bill and Public Service Broadcasting Bill. He asserts that this turbulent relationship between the government and the media dates back to the days of South African struggle years against the apartheid system, which was characterised by censorship. He contends that the new self-censorship regulation is more dangerous than external censorship. He critically considered the validity of a number of theories, including Authoritarianism, Libertarianism, social responsibility theory, communist theory, development and democratic participant theory. For him, media practice in South Africa is best aligned with social responsibility theory. In the final analysis, Professor Fourie examines the postmodern and postcolonial critique of the normative narratives, and suggests that, on the one hand, South Africa consists of elements of pre-modern, modern and postmodern societies which gives room for plurality of platform and mediated transactions to occur from classical models to modern technology oriented in contemporary societies. On the other hand, postcolonial critique argues for the de-colonisation and de-westernisation of the media. Given the nature of media profession, he contends that a normative framework is more appropriate than a moral philosophy that *Ubuntu* represents. He juxtaposes Ubuntu and the normative theory as a possible framework for the media profession. The normative framework for professional practice encourages negotiation, inclusiveness, transparency and tolerance, community, collectivity, individual participation in a collective life and community participation. For Fourie, *Ubuntu* is similar to western communitarianism. He suggests that further discussion is required on Ubuntu as discourse in the responsibility of the media in South Africa.

Professor Abiodun Salawu presented a paper entitled: *Politics of Identity in the Nigerian Press*. In his paper, Professor Salawu gives an ethnic and geographical analysis of the Nigerian populace as diverse and pluralistic. He establishes that conflicts in Nigeria are constructed along religious lines, namely, Islamic and Christian religions. Ethnicity has played a role in the location, distribution and the audience of the Nigerian Media. He argued that ethnic identity helps to create a sense worth in Nigeria which sometime determines the gravity and intensity of conflict in Nigeria. The contestation over the negation and preservation of ethnic identity is central to full scale size conflicts in Nigeria. For him the media involvement is ontological who by default cover the conflicts as they unfold. This provides a festering ground for the manipulation of the media as the propaganda mechanism to influence collective behaviour and opinion of the Nigerian people. Propaganda is usually instrumentalised in the Nigerian conflict situations because 'vested interests are at stake in strongly contested issues' which function to demoralise the enemy and procure support of neutral persons. Included in the devices of propaganda are: recall of biases, name-calling, testimonials, bandwagon and over generalisations. Critical to staging an effective propaganda campaign is selective retention, whereby actions are emphasised, reiterated and reinforced in the memory of the audience which are determined by pre-existing frame of reference, namely, attitudes, interests and beliefs, and these reinforcement could be either negative, positive or contestatory and adversarial. According to Professor Salawu, the frame of reference are determined by the negative perception of other ethnic groups held by a certain group at a material time, and each crisis provides an opportunity to inveigh against the perceived misconducts other groups. Professor Salawu gives applied the propaganda theory to two different religion related conflict in Nigeria. The first emanated from the comment made by a Nigerian columnist insinuating that Prophet Mohammed would be interested in the Miss World beauty pageants, and secondly, Nigerian Muslims' response to the Danish cartoonist saga. The columnist generated two different reactions in Nigeria: the Northern muslims considered it blasphemous deserving of violent consequences, while the southern simply regarded it as simply insensitive and irresponsible. Similarly, the Northerners reacted violently to the Danish cartoon saga which led to a significantly high loss of property and lives in Nigeria. Beyond the violent reaction of the northern Muslims are the ethnic and ideological interest of the media that further emphasise north south ethno-religious dichotomy.



Professor Abiodun Salawu
University of Fort Hare



Professor Michaelangelo Masemola
UNISA

Professor Masemola's paper entitled: *African Migrant Discursive Exits and Entries into South African Ports of Entry: The Airport Geography of Power as Site and Limit of the Rhetoric of Profiling*, examines current trends in negating and suspending individual rights their bodies at what he termed as 'zone of exception' like the airport following the installation of surveillance cameras and intrusive body and property search at airports. Travellers in transit at the airport have lost their anonymity to the visibility and exposure rendered by the confluence of technology of surveillance. This technology in themselves create a new discourse around the flow of capital, flow of migrants, racial profiling which is invidious towards Africans and create different categories of black persons, some south African and others, Africans. The profiling valorizes the stereotypes of blacks immigrants as traffickers and their white counterparts are investors. This situation is aggravated when the distinguished African literary giant and Nobel prize winner, Wole Soyinka was subjected to ill-treatment at the Oliver Tambo airport on his arrival to deliver a keynote address at the Nelson Mandela Foundation. The dispossession of the individual of exclusivity and privacy not only contradicts geopolitical realities, but casts the discourse into the throes of racial and criminalized profiling of black bodies. The fact that South Africa is a

destination of choice for work and tourism purposes creates a tension between nationalist discourse and pan-African agenda. In as much as it is near impossible for black (African) bodies to be reclaimed from misnomer profiling, African intelligentsia should seek to continue to engage with zones of exception that seeks to negate the African identity. Professor Masemola concedes that the constant presence of security problems makes it a difficult task since it undermines the gravity of harassments that travellers are being subjected.



Ms Dorothee Holscher
UKZN

Connected to Professor Masemola's paper is Ms Dorothee Holscher's presentation entitled: *Discourses and Practices of Othering in encounters between South Africans and cross-border migrants: An application of Joan Tronto's 'Moral Boundaries'*. She looks at identity, beyond the 'zone of exception' and how dynamics of interaction redefine and shape migratory discourses around locals/foreign dichotomy, particularly as it related to foreign migrants who were displaced as a result of xenophobic violence that broke out in certain locations in South Africa in 2008. The project, *inter alia*, is an application of Tronto's notion of 'privileged responsibilities'- 'the privilege of the privileged'. The question the responsibility of the individual especially when one is well placed to do good but failed in his duty to do so. The structures that place constraints on liberatory discourses require attention and she has identified a *locus* where such discourses and counter discourses were produced within a social system that was established primary for spiritual and social development. The discourse that is generat-

ed by national discourse characterised foreign blacks as the other which is a reiteration of the denigration of the black body beyond the point of entry. The issues generated by xenophobia were 'add-ons' to the existential dichotomies that already existed in the church: rich/poor, white/black. Further dichotomies that became noteworthy were: highly educated/ not so educated, had accommodation/ displaced, and pre-displacement history of lavish existence / penury. That the church became a source of succour to the displaced immigrant became a generative force the production of a new discursive schema. The duty of the interventionist is to look for ways to maleate the negative discourse and seek remedial measures for rehabilitation and restoration. For Ms Holscher, this requires a theory that questions the universalist morality and posits its limitation given that 'othering' is embedded in everyday discourse.

Mr Rewai Makamani's paper focussed on the possibility of integrating the use of proverbs into conflict resolution processes. In his paper: *African proverbs and conflict management: A Case Study of selected Shona, Oshivambo, Yoruba and Swahili Proverbial Expressions* proposes that *ubuntuism* can be used as a strategy to mitigate conflict situations. Micro level application of proverbs can help to curtail the magnification of conflict since most large conflicts emanate from personal interactions. Africa already has a rich resource of wisdom in proverbs which can evoke emotions connected to collective memories. For him, proverbs have universal rhetorical application, which can be understood inter-culturally and cross-culturally. African proverbs have been used effectively by African leaders in multilateral institutions like the United Nations. Makamani cited examples of conflict resolution proverbs from four African languages, insisting on the positive usage only for resolution of conflict and social cohesion. According to him, this can also help in economic development. Proverbs encode for both the speaker and listeners volume of texts, values and philosophies that can be summed up in short memorable sentences. Similar sayings present themselves as adages, metaphors, anecdotes and aphorisms which possess persuasive potential. These proverbs emphasize collaboration, consensus and orientation toward common solution. He calls for the re-introduction of proverbs into school curriculum in order to raise a new generation that will grow up with African value system.



Mr Rewai Makamani
The Polytechnic of Namibia

Mr Mpho Chaka's paper considers various theoretical approaches to national identity and nation building in South Africa. Chaka's paper, entitled, *Cultural Rhetoric and Nation-building: The Logic of Nation Building as a function of Public Relations*, arises against the backdrop of non successful provision of socio-economic amenities by the ANC led South African government for the South African populace which has made the promotion and realisation of national identity difficult. Central to the reconstruction of national identity is the reconciliation, whose process was established during the tenure of the first president of democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela. The construction of a national identity for the most part remains a national project and work in progress in South Africa after sixteen years of independence. In theory, the ANC led government tries to mollify racial tension through practical approaches to inter-culturalism in order to achieve 'public participation, promote stability and enhance state functioning.' However, Chaka raises critical questions about ANC's approaches to nation building and its achievements of the so-called national identity 1994. He attempted to prove insight through presidential rhetoric, and view it through the lenses of public relation especially as it relates to domestic and foreign policy communications.



Mr Mpho Chaka
University of the North West



The second day commenced with a keynote address by Dr Segun Ige, *African Presidential Rhetoric: Parameters for Shaping the Continent*. Dr Ige views current political developments as a catalyst for the reconfiguration of Africa's

Dr Segun Ige
JOI Consulting

political landscape and formations. While this portends an expansion of democracy in Africa, it also lends itself to the notion of uniformity in political governance which may render some governments as

'clone' democratic states without proper consolidated governance and administrative structures. His paper partly draws on Tullis' work on *Rhetorical Presidency* suggesting that political transformation can be achieved through the agency of the presidential rhetoric. In order to achieve transformation at the executive level, Ige believes that some fundamental issues have to be addressed, for example, the form of presidential arrangements in different states, issues relating to foundational doctrines of the states and their faithful adherence and a clear understanding of the mantra: 'African Solution to African Problems.' He advocates for scientific engagement with the principles that constitute the Presidency rather than focussing on the personalities occupy the presidency. There is acknowledgement that African political practice has always involved eminent personalities and so theories of rhetorical practice must be such that can account for both the principles and cultural nuances that feed into presidential rhetorical practice. He also addresses the issue of documentation of presidential orations for research purposes.

Professor Kermit Campbell's paper: *Playing or Proving the Enemy? The Rhetor's Ethical Test*, is a textual analysis of the film, *Invictus*, whose leading role is played by Morgan Freeman as 'Mandela,' and directed by Clint Eastwood. He argues that the film surpasses any literary or performative intentionality that the director may have conceived about. The power of sport to unite a nation is diminished by the sturdy ethical personality of Mandela and evidence within the narrative as 'rhetorical, *tour de force*, a demonstration

of the rhetorical genius of the protagonist, Nelson Mandela.' For Campbell, Mandela is an example of a Ciceronian *orator*, who possesses not only a clear knowledge of the times and administrative acumen that goes with the office, but also a strategic rhetorical instinct that creates an unrivalled ethical platform that would serve as a balance of forces in a racially polarized newly independent South Africa. He suggests that *Invictus* and the personality of Mandela, require an interpretation that goes beyond


Professor Kermit Campbell
Colgate University, USA



the platitudes of elaborate use of rhetorical devices or Platonic cynicism of oratorical practice. The two rhetorical situations in the film: his plea to white staff at the presidency to remain in the service of the state, and the secondly, an un-announced appearance at the ANC National Council meeting to disband the inherited name, *Springboks*, each showed a redemptive intervention and unprecedented unanimity which establish his credential as an ethical rhetorical strategist, orator and statesman.

Professor Jairos Kangira presented a paper co-authored with Ms Jemima Hipondoka, entitled: *Praiseworthy Values and Subtleties in President Hifikepunye Pohamba's Epideictic Speech Marking Namibia's 20th anniversary of Independence*. In his paper, he focuses on the rarity of gumption displayed by President Pohamba announcing his exit date from the presidency. In some other contexts, this is not unique, but in Africa where presidents want to stay in power perpetually, Kangira considers this act worthy of consideration. He draws on Philippe Salazar's concept of African-Athens and Aristotle's definition of *ethos*. Kangira's analysis of the speech focused on not only, the encomiums of eminent personalities who significantly contributed to the struggle for the nation's independence, but also the motifs of tolerance and inclusiveness that pervaded the speech. Kangira posits that the president's recognition of opposition party leader in his speech should signal to SWAPO party members that members of the opposition parties were compatriots and fellow nation-builders. Critical to his speech is the salutation, 'Fellow Namibians', which suggest an atmosphere of 'togetherness, egalitarianism, equality'. Further to the theme of inclusiveness, are motifs of integrity and commitment to uphold the constitution. Pohamba's addressing of positive values that might contribute to the rule of law and governance, is balanced with the call to the nation to eschew attitudes and actions that are potentially destructive cohesiveness of the Namibian nation.

Professor Jairos Kangira
UNAM



Next is a presentation from by Dr Tim Quinlan. The paper entitled: *Rhetoric in AU Declarations: Intersections of Executive Deliberation and Citizenship in Africa* was co-authored with Dr Segun Ige as part of a larger project that looks at states' responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the continent. The paper borrows Derrida's term of 'citizen as enemy' to critique OAU/AU's declaration over a period of 30 years revealing the good intentions of Africa's presidents to deal headlong with the epidemic, but having to contend with existing problems that resulted in either achieving minimally or 'reversing the gains' achieved within the historical period considered in the paper. The paper encourages the development of public dialogue around policy matters toward making effective and timely implementation possible.

Dr Tim Quinlan
Formerly, HEARD, UKZN

Professor Jaap De Jong explores the subject of collaboration between speechwriters and speakers in producing great speeches. The paper entitled: *In search for Kairos: Problems and solutions for the collaboration of speechwriters and speakers*, explores the parallels between Dutch and American speechwriters and speakers. Examples include Ronald Reagan's historical counsel to Gorbachev, 'Mr Gorbachev, tear down this wall'. Jaap de Jong asserts that the speech production process is a potential location for disagreement which if resolved could produce an enduring memorable oration. He alludes to the Greek origin of the word, as having an association with the god *Kairos*. *Kairos* is for the most part a 'seize the moment' philosophy that every individual needs to take very seriously and ensure appropriate action is taken to guarantee success. This largely explains the intensity and gravity of the speech process which has to resonate with time and the audience.

Professor Jaap De Jong
Leiden University, The Netherlands



Dr Elewani Ramugondo explores the intersection of play with rhetoric in her paper: *Play rhetoric across generations within family: A window of opportunity to discern the African Condition*. According to her, Dr Ramugondo has been preoccupied with the 'changing nature of children's play over time. The other that has been the most influential, has been the introduction of rhetoric into the study and children's discourse about play.' It is possible to identify seven categories of play from existing literature: 'play as progress, play as power, play as fate, play as imaginary, play as self, play as identity and play as frivolity'. Play for Dr Ramugondo assumes a deeper level of meaning and helps to understand where ideologies that guide interactions of people within social groups, especially, across generations. Play for her has a regenerative and transformational potential that if explored, we can better understand the African identity which is constantly being redefined and this definition can be seen through the lenses of children as they articulate themselves when they deploying play strategies and other creative ways like satire. Although lack of adult involvement help younger generations to demonstrate 'poignant skills' in developing new approaches to play, intergenerational discourse through identity rhetoric displayed by adults, is a precondition establishing a the regenerative context of play which may or may not suggest adult control over the dynamics of play in the family. She concludes that children might be a rich resource for understanding play.

Dr Elewani Ramugondo
UCT



Dr Paulene Naidoo discusses the importance of understanding each other's culture in an international intercultural business context. Her paper entitled: *Intercultural Communication: A comparative Study of Japanese and South African Work Practice*, co-authored by Professor Vijay Rugbeer and Dr Yasmin Rugbeer, looks at the cultural ideologies guiding business practices between South African and Japan. According to her, these are divergent cultures and given the rapidly globalising world, these two cultures meet in both national and international business and organisational contexts. The Japanese business practice is value laden which emphasises honesty, sincerity and compatibility, while the South African business practice, which largely has been influenced by the western culture, capitalises on space and territoriality. She has observed in contemporary society that people are realising the importance of forming 'relationships' in the era of globalisation and increasing intercontinental business transactions in order to minimise fallouts. She believes that effective intercultural communication is key to achieving success in a world where individual autonomy is systematically being eroded. She cites Toyota as a case study and given their global base, this multinational organisation might have some lessons to teach other aspiring organisations from other parts of the world. She further stresses the strong connection between language and culture and how a dialectical understanding may help organisations manage intercultural dynamics in cross-cultural business contexts. Technology, through its different strands of digital development and innovation, has also helped to accentuate intercultural communication in a multicultural global context.

Dr Paulene Naidoo
DUT, Durban



The last presentation was delivered by Dr Busayo Ige on her interaction with the students in the intervention programme at both the University of KwaZulu-Natal Durban and the University of Cape Town. From her experience, she has discovered that the demand of academic language can be a problem not only for second language English students, but also first language speakers who required training and development. The two institutions mentioned above have established Academic development programme and Intervention Programme respectively to deal with the problems of the provenance deficit in students learning. Although her presentation is verisimilitude of the auto enquiry approach, she mainly draws on Goffman's theory of 'self' who argues that 'self is not the process of performance but the result of it'. For her, identity is important in negotiating power and space with the students, having realised that identity is

both social and personal. She observed that students in the Academic Development at the University of KwaZulu-Natal negotiate identity differently from students at the University of Cape Town.

Dr Busayo Ige
UCT



Her work requires different conversational approaches to interacting with students especially, when they need to discuss personal problems that would help her develop her intervention strategy. For her, the process is as important as the result. In essence, she adopted a reciprocal concessional approach where students determine the conversational dynamic which eventually would lead the student to request for her help before any meaningful intervention could be set up. It is through this process that she coined the phrase: 'power of us in 'I''. Creating an atmosphere of inclusivity and partnership between the staff and student proved for her to be very effective. The academic development officer requires sensitivity to the culture of the students that she is dealing with which will help in conceptualising strategies that would be most effective since there is no one size fit all approach.

Pictures by: Segun Ige and Biodun Salawu: Notes by: Dorothee Hölcher and Segun Ige







Above: Professor Kermit Campberll, Ms Dorothee, Professor Biodun Salawu and Dr Busayo Ige.
Below: Delegates at on of the presentations





The End
Or
Yonder



South Africa at the Durban Climate Summit: Climate justice versus market narratives



Patrick Bond
Professor and Director, Centre for Civil Society,
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban

Introduction

Judging by what transpired at the June 2011 global climate negotiations in Bonn, it appears certain that the South African port city of Durban will host the 'COP 17' (Conference of Parties), mostly responsible for global warming and extreme climate chaos. It also appears certain that Pretoria's alliance with Washington, Beijing, New Delhi and Brasilia, witnessed in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, will be extended to other capitals positioned to subvert the Kyoto Protocol, especially Ottawa, Tokyo and Moscow, along with Brussels and London carbon traders.

What all observers now expect is a conference with no meaningful action following. Not only will the Kyoto Protocol be allowed to expire at the end of its first commitment period (2012). Far worse, Durban will primarily be a conference characterized by profiteering, as carbon trading – the privatization of the air, giving rich states and companies the property-right to pollute – is cemented as the founda-

tion of the next decade's global climate malgovernance. Indeed, a telling diplomatic move in Bonn was when Pretoria negotiators, weighed down by team members from polluters Eskom, Sasol and the National Business Initiative, tried to break African solidarity against European Union plans for opening up new carbon markets (in exchange for Europe emitting much more GreenHouse Gas pollution) – instead of doing the honorable thing by paying the EU's vast climate debt to Africa.

Within South Africa, an ambiguity is discernible: on the one hand, Pretoria's politicians and officials will legitimize global what could be termed as 'climate apartheid', as the COP17 begins at the Durban International Convention Centre, at the same time they embark on projects that could aggravate climate change at home by:

- building two of the world's four largest coal-fired powerplants for \$20 billion each at Kusile and Medupi (not to mention new nuclear powerplants);
 - digging a vast new \$14 billion port in South Durban, announced in June;
 - expanding Durban's controversial, health-threatening oil refining capacity so as to double flows to Johannesburg via a new \$3.5 billion pipeline (with cost escalations rising from a \$1.3 billion pricetag in 2006);
 - constructing a new \$12 billion heavy-oil refinery in Port Elizabeth; and
- offering shell-gas fracking exploration rights to South African, Norwegian and US firms in the fragile Drakensburg mountain range.

Moreover, the promised \$100 billion/year Green Climate Fund, far larger than any other financing source ever assembled, is co-chaired by the current National Planning Minister, Trevor Manuel, who seemingly offered no objection to these eco-catastrophic investments. Indeed as finance minister, Manuel repeatedly gave SA's state power corporation Eskom approval to continue supplying the world's cheapest electricity to BHP Billiton and the Anglo American Corporation while raising poor people's power prices to unaffordable heights so as to pay for the expensive plants.

The GCF may do far more harm than good, especially if it funds 'false solutions' such as biotech, Genetically Modified trees and plants, timber plantations, nuclear energy, carbon capture and storage, or seeding the air with the coolant SO₂ and the sea with iron filings to create algae blooms. Trevor Manuel has argued that the GCF should raise up to half its funds through carbon trading, a strategy that will probably fail because of periodic carbon market collapses.

Still, a binding global deal is ultimately needed, and replacing Kyoto with a voluntary 'Durban Package' would be disastrous given the US, European Union and Japanese track-record on underfunding, cheating and bribery. Thanks to the December 2010 release of US State Department cables by Julian Assange and (the accused) Bradley Manning, it is undeniable that Washington negotiators Todd Stern and Jonathan Pershing bully weak state elites (e.g. from the Maldives and Ethiopia), and that the EU's Connie Hedegaard joined them to plot defunding the GCF in February 2010, according to WikiLeaks.

To meet scientific requirements for planet-saving emissions cuts requires a binding UN effort like that made in 1987 in Montreal to ban CFCs, the chemical that was widening the deadly ozone hole. But given the rise of neoliberalism (1990s), neo-conservatism (2000s) and their subsequent fusion as the dominant ideologies within the United Nations, a repeat of the Montreal Protocol is not possible anytime soon. So at the last two climate COPs, in Copenhagen (2009) and Cancún (2010), Pretoria has lined up with the delegations doing the most environmental damage: the US and the 'BASIC' countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). The result, according to Bolivia's Ambassador to the United Nations, Pablo Sólón, are "commitments of emissions reductions that leads us to a scenario of [a temperature increase of] 4 degrees Celsius. And that is absolutely unacceptable. We need to come out of South Africa with commitments of emissions reductions that will put us in a scenario of between 1 to 1.5 degrees Celsius in order to preserve our planet and life as we know it." Concluded Sólón, one of the few negotiators brave enough to speak truth to power inside the UN (prior to his resignation in June 2011), "South Africa is the place to fight against the new apartheid against Mother Earth and its vital systems."

Local activists will join this fight knowing their politicians and activities of officials are potentially destructive. One reason Durban will be regarded in future as the city that amplified climate apartheid, is the elites' hunger to codify and even celebrate market-based environmental governance, including the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) programme. According to Sólón, "There is a proposal in the Cancún agreement that focuses everything on ... guidelines in the capacity of forests to

capture CO2. We must not focus on how to prepare forests for a market mechanism, we must fight deforestation now."

REDD's most powerful advocate has been the World Bank, which is also the trustee for the Green Climate Fund, leading to civil society demands for its repulsion. "The World Bank is part of the climate problem, not the climate solution," Sebastian Valdomir of Friends of the Earth International said at Bonn. "Its appalling social and environmental track record should immediately disqualify it from playing any role whatsoever in designing the Green Climate Fund, and in climate finance more generally." A case in point explored in more detail below: the Bank's \$3.75 billion loan to Eskom last year, mainly to fund the Medupi plant in spite of well-known conflicts of interest (African National Congress investments in Hitachi boiler construction) and worsening inability to pay for electricity by poor South Africans, who continue 'service delivery protests' at amongst the highest rate in the world.

Rather than expect the World Bank and carbon markets to tackle our greatest challenge, Sólón proposed an international financial transactions tax to fund climate aid. The North's existing commitments, such as the supposed \$30 billion in fast track funding pledged by Hillary Clinton at Copenhagen through 2012, is proving to be just as reliable as the G8's Gleneagles Summit 2005 financing pledges to Africa. Conferences of promisers and of empty pledges, such as Clinton's – as unveiled at Bonn by her own colleagues on June 7 ("there will not be \$100 billion a year in the GCF") – have one main purpose: to deflect the world's justified anger at how Northern pollution threatens us all. There is another deflection tactic we can expect in Durban, just as at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, when Third World Network's Martin Khor condemned the host chair (Thabo Mbeki) for importing the exclusionary methodology of the World Trade Organisation's 'Green Rooms'. Venezuela's negotiators in Bonn criticized Pretoria's "proliferation of innovative ideas" that were hashed out beyond closed doors.

The rest of this paper addresses particular problems associated with neoliberal climate policy in the host country:

South African Climate Injustice

It would seem that the site of the Conference of the Parties 17 climate summit in November-December 2011 does not have good record in dealing with climate change. According to the Pretoria government's 2010 *National Climate Change Response Green Paper*, "Should multi-lateral international action not effectively limit the average global temperature increase to below at least 2°C above pre-industrial levels, the potential impacts on South Africa in the medium- to long-term are significant and potentially catastrophic." The paper warned that under conservative assumptions, "after 2050, warming is projected to reach around 3-4°C along the coast, and 6-7°C in the interior." [1]

More evidence of the Witwatersrand's degradation comes from tireless water campaigner Mariette Liefferink, who counts 270 tailings dams in a 400 square kilometer mining zone. With gold nearly depleted, as Liefferink told a Johannesburg newspaper in early 2011, uranium is an eco-social activist target: "Nowhere in the world do you see these mountains of uranium and people living in and among them. You have people living on hazardous toxic waste and of course some areas are also high in radioactivity." The toxic tailings dams are typically unlined, unvegetated and unable to contain the mines' prolific air, water and soil pollution. Other long-term anti-mining struggles continue in South African locales: against platinum in the Northwest and Limpopo provinces, against titanium on the Eastern Cape's Wild Coast, and against coal in the area bordering Zimbabwe known as Mapungubwe where relics from a priceless ancient civilization will be destroyed unless mining is halted (as even the government agrees). [2]

As both victim and villain, here are some reasons why South Africa is a poster-child for extremist elite mismanagement of the climate threat, instead of its solution through climate justice:

- South Africa's vast CO₂ emissions can be measured in relative terms, and if so, its carbon intensity per capita unit of GDP output is amongst the world's highest, far worse than even the US.
- The main sources of this pollution are two activities that reflect continuity, not change from apartheid: the coal-burning power plants of the parastatal Eskom and the coal/gas-to-oil conversions of Sasol, formerly a parastatal mandated to foil the apartheid-era petroleum embargo, and

then privatized and listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

Virtually no contributions to the grid (less than 4 percent in 2010) come from South Africa's incredible renewable energy potential, in solar, tidal and wind sources.

The electricity produced by burning coal is cross-subsidised so that it is the cheapest available anywhere in the world for the world's largest mining and metals corporations, BHP Billiton and Anglo American Corporation, which were revealed in 2010 to be paying less than US\$0.02/kiloWatt hour of electricity for smelter consumption thanks to apartheid-era, four-decade "Special Pricing Agreement" deals (other large corporations received electricity in 2009 at US\$0.05, still below cost, and although prices rose dramatically on average, the lowest increases were imposed on the biggest firms).

The two main metals/mining firms, plus most other major beneficiaries of cheap electricity such as Arcelor Mittal and Xstrata, export their profits both through illegal transfer pricing and through straight repatriation of dividends to shareholders in London and Melbourne, and the downstream consumption of their metals product is minimal due to notorious local overpricing.

Meanwhile, millions of poor people are regularly disconnected or denied access to the grid due to extreme poverty, and because of dirty household energy, the passage is often rapid from HIV-positive to full-blown AIDS status via respiratory-related opportunistic infections, including the raging TB epidemic.

Corruption is built in to energy-intensive mining and industry, ranging from controversial ruling-party dealmaking in the sector, 'Black Economic Empowerment' shakedowns for well-connected tycoons, and corporate malfeasance in climate deals such as Sasol and Eskom attempts to secure CDM subsidies. [3]

But in addition to these factors, explored in more detail below, there is an even more durable way in which the African National Congress (ANC) government in Pretoria contributes to climate injustice: its stance in global climate politics. With the United States, four 'BASIC' countries – Brazil, South Africa, India and China

– co-sponsored the Copenhagen Accord in December 2009, even though Pretoria's then environment minister Buyelwa Sonjica (since relieved of duties in late 2010) officially expressed 'disappointment' at what was on offer. [4] The Copenhagen gambit meant that the WTO's notorious divide-and-rule politics – which were controversially endorsed by South Africa (by trade minister Alec Erwin) at the 1999 Seattle, 2001 Doha and 2003 Cancún summits but vetoed by the African delegation at the first and third [5] – would become the norm for UN climate negotiations.

Another UN process, the 'High-Level Advisory Group on Finance' which reported to Ban Ki-moon in November 2010, included South African planning minister Trevor Manuel as an active commission member. It was no surprise when extremely conservative recommendations resulted, such as up to half the North-South climate financing to be made available by 2020 packaged by carbon markets in the form of CDMs.[6] Nor was it a surprise that Manuel became front-runner to chair the full Green Development Fund in April 2011.

Three case studies provide explicit evidence of the problems South Africans face on the front lines of climate and energy injustice: first, the Medupi coal-fired power plant financed by the World Bank in 2010 with its largest-ever project loan; second, the pilot CDM deal in Durban at Bisasar Road; and third, the struggle over access to electricity waged from below, specifically in Soweto. After introductory critiques of Pretoria's political economy and as a climate negotiator, these are each considered in turn.

A Political Ecology of South African Neoliberalism

While local and international elites collaborated during the transition from racial to class apartheid, most South Africans were negatively affected by the neoliberal policies imposed by the governments of Nelson Mandela (1994-99), Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), Kgalema Motlanthe (2008-09) and Jacob Zuma (2009-presents). The results included an immediate rise in income inequality, with the Gini coefficient soaring from below 0.6 in 1994 to 0.72 by 2006 (0.8 if welfare spending is excluded). [7] The official unemployment rate doubled from 16 percent in 1994 to around 32 percent by the early 2000s, falling to 26 percent by the late 2000s when in 2009-10 another 1.3 million jobs were lost – but by counting those who gave up looking for work, the realistic rate is closer to 40 percent. [8] The long-term

explanations for the employment massacre were increased imports in labour-intensive sectors and imported machines to exacerbate capital-intensive production techniques. Meanwhile, ecological problems became far worse, according to the government's 2006 'Environmental Outlook' research report, which noted 'a general decline in the state of the environment'. [9]

Social unrest and the rise of social movements reflect the discontent. There were 5813 protests in 2004-05, and subsequently, an average of 8,000 per year. [10] Until China overtook around 2009, this was probably the highest per capita rate of social protest in the world during the late 2000s. Matters will likely not improve, in part because of macroeconomic trends. The most severe problem is the vulnerability that South Africa faces in hostile global financial markets, given that the current account deficit remains one of the world's highest. It is also highly likely that investment and economic activity will be deterred by ongoing electricity shortages, given that it will take a generation for sufficient capacity to be added, and that the government confirmed its desire in early 2008 to continue offering a few large smelters and mines the cheapest electricity in the world, instead of redistributing to low-income people.

Electricity generation shortfalls during January-March 2008 led to consistent surprise 'load shedding' in which entire metropolitan areas were taken off the electricity grid. These were due partly to a lack of new capacity built by national power generator Eskom since the early 1990s (when excess capacity had risen to more than 30 percent), the running down of coal supplies, and rain damage to incoming coal. But the main reason was the increased electricity consumption of metals smelters due to the 2002-08 speculative uptick in commodity prices. Indeed, South African capital's reliance upon fossil fuels for energy is scandalous. Not only are vast carbon-based profits fleeing to the mining houses' offshore financial headquarters but, despite consuming huge amounts of electricity, the smelters create very few jobs. Instead of cutting back on these sorts of projects, and turning the subsidies to renewables, the ANC government attempted to augment coal-fired generation with, first, dangerous new Pebble Bed nuclear technology (rejected by German nuclear producers in the 1990s and finally in 2010 defunded by finance minister Pravin Gordhan in frustration) and then with dangerous existing technology reactors. Renewable sources like wind, solar, wave, tidal,

and biomass are the most obvious ways forward for this century's energy system, but still get only a tiny pittance of government support.

Behind the excessive consumption of electricity is a long history of cheap energy for big capital made possible by the availability of large amounts of poor quality coal and an awkward relationship between the coal mines, gold industry and Eskom. A history of state intervention in securing the energy needs of the mines, agriculture and industry established the principle of keeping electricity as cheap as possible for big capital. [11] The ANC government did not change this arrangement, which helps explain why its posture at recent climate summits has been in defense of the world emissions *status quo*.

The new government was as coopted as the old regime by the "Minerals Energy Complex", the phrase that captures the fusion of state, mining houses and heavy industry, especially in beneficiating metallic and mineral products through smelting. As Ben Fine and Zav Rustomjee showed in their 1996 book *The Political Economy of South Africa*, throughout the twentieth century, mining, petro-chemicals, metals and related activities which historically accounted for around a quarter of GDP typically consumed 40 per cent of all electricity, at the world's cheapest rates. [12] David McDonald updated and regionalized the concept a decade onwards in his edited collection, *Electric Capitalism*, discovering an 'MEC-plus':

Mining is South Africa's largest industry in the primary economic sector and the country has the world's largest reserves of platinum-group metals (87.7 percent of world totals), manganese (80 percent), chromium (72.4 percent), gold (40.1 percent) and alumino-silicates (34.4 percent)... South Africa's appetite for electricity has created something of a 'scramble' for the continent's electricity resources, with the transmission lines of today comparable to the colonial railway lines of the late 1800s and early 1900s, physically and symbolically. [13]

Eskom fostered a debilitating dependence on the (declining) mining industry, causing a 'Dutch disease', in memory of the damage done to Holland's economic balance by its cheap North Sea oil, which in South Afri-

ca's case is cheap but very dirty coal. As a study by the Energy for Development Research Centre found, South Africa,

- is 'the most vulnerable fossil fuel exporting country in the world' if the Kyoto Protocol is fully extended, according to an International Energy Agency report (because of the need to make deep cuts);
- is 'the most vulnerable fossil fuel exporting country in the world' if the Kyoto Protocol is fully extended, according to an International Energy Agency report (because of the need to make deep cuts);
- has a 'heavy reliance' on energy-intensive industries;
- suffers a 'high dependence on coal for primary energy';
- offers 'low energy prices' to large corporate consumers and high-income households, which in part is responsible for 'poor energy efficiency of individual sectors'; and
- risks developing a 'competitive disadvantage' by virtue of 'continued high energy intensity' which in the event of energy price rises 'can increase the cost of production'. [14]

As a result, when corrected for income and population size, South Africa's emissions are higher than even the energy sector of the United States, *by a factor of twenty*. [15] To deal with this legacy, the government adopted a *Long-Term Mitigation Scenario* in mid-2008, to great fanfare, calling for cuts in CO₂, but only starting after 2035. Meantime, the rollout of at least a hundred billion dollars worth of new coal-fired and nuclear plants ensued. And tellingly, the 2004 National Climate Change Response Strategy endorsed carbon trading, declaring 'up-front that CDM primarily presents a range of commercial opportunities, both big and small.' [16] Finally in late 2010, an official policy document emerged.

- more imminent multi-billion dollar financing decisions on Eskom coal-fired mega power plants (with more price increases for the masses);
- the conclusion of the energy ministry's multi-decade resource planning exercise, which is run by a committee dominated by electricity-guzzling corporations; and

- Pretoria's contributions to four global climate debates: President Jacob Zuma's co-chairing of a UN sustainable development commission, Planning Minister Trevor Manuel's role within the UN Advisory Group on Climate Finance seeking \$100 bn/year in North-South flows, the G8-G20 meetings in France, and the COP 17 preparatory committee meetings.

Many would recall from 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development prep-coms how pressure rose on negotiators to be as unambitious and non-binding as possible. At that Johannesburg summit, climate change was completely ignored and the main host politicians – President Thabo Mbeki, Foreign Minister Nkosozana Dlamini-Zuma and Environment Minister Valli Moosa – were criticized for, as Martin Khor (now head of the South Centre) put it, 'the utter lack of transparency and procedure in the political declaration process. Some of the delegates, familiar with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), remarked in the frustration that the in frustration that the infamous WTO Green Room process had now crossed over to the usually open and participatory UN system.' [17]

At the Durban COP, their successors Zuma, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane and Edna Molewa would almost certainly surrender democratic principles and let secretive Green Room deal-making sites proliferate. Two authors of the *Green Paper* are environment officials Joanne Yawitch and Peter Lukey, both from struggle-era backgrounds in land and environmental NGOs, and once dedicated to far-reaching social change. But in early 2011, Yawitch moved to the National Business Initiative, following the path through the state-capital revolving door so many before her also trod. At the Copenhagen COP in December 2009, lead G77 negotiator Lumumba Di-Aping accused Yawitch of having "actively sought to disrupt the unity of the Africa bloc," [18] a charge she forced him to publicly apologise for, even though within days Zuma proved it true by signing the Africa-frying Copenhagen Accord.

Right from the *Green Paper's* initial premise – "South Africa is both a contributor to, and potential victim of, global climate change given that it has an energy-intensive, fossil-fuel powered economy and is also highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate variability and change" – this document seems to fit within an all too predictable Pretoria formula: talking left, so as to more rapidly walk right. As a result, the *Green Paper* claims, with a straight face: "South Africa, as a

responsible global citizen, is committed to reducing its own greenhouse gas emissions in order to successfully facilitate the agreement and implementation of an effective and binding global agreement." More appropriate would be this reality-based rephrasing: "South Africa, as an irresponsible global citizen, is committed to rapidly increasing its own greenhouse gas emissions by building the third and fourth-largest coal-fired power plants in the world (Kusile and Medupi) mainly for the benefit of BHP Billiton and Anglo American which get the world's cheapest electricity thanks to apartheid-era, forty-year discount deals, and to successfully facilitate the agreement and implementation of an ineffective and non-binding global agreement – the Copenhagen Accord – which is receiving support from other countries only because of coercion, bullying and bribery by the US State Department, as WikiLeaks has revealed."

Consistent with Washington's climate agenda, Pretoria's *Green Paper* suggests we "limit the average global temperature increase to at least below 2°C above pre-industrial levels" yet this target is so weak that scientists predict nine out of ten African farmers will lose their ability to grow crops by the end of the century. In contrast, the 2010 Cochabamba People's Agreement hosted by Bolivian president Evo Morales demanded no more than a 1-1.5°C rise, a vast difference when it comes to emissions cuts needed to reach back to 350 parts per million of CO2 equivalents in our atmosphere, as 'science requires.' [19]

Failing that, the *Green Paper* acknowledges (using even conservative assumptions), "After 2050, warming is projected to reach around 3-4°C along the coast, and 6-7°C in the interior. With these kinds of temperature increases, life as we know it will change completely." As one example, "the frequency of storm-flow events and dry spells is projected to increase over much of the country, especially in the east, over much of the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, including some of the most crucial source regions of stream-flows in southern Africa such as the Lesotho highlands." In the COP17 host city itself, Durban's sea-level rise is anticipated to be nearly double as fast – close to 3 mm/year – as the SA south coast's in the immediate future, but new research models suggest several more meters of seawater height are possible by the end of the century, swamping central Durban.

Another sure hit to Durban will likely be via the port, Africa's biggest, because of a growing "reluctance to trade in goods with a high carbon footprint," the *Green Paper* admits. "The term 'food miles' is used to refer to the distance food is transported from the point of production to the point of consumption, and is increasingly being used as a carbon emission label for food products." Further 'economic risks' include "the impacts of climate change regulation, the application of trade barriers, a shift in consumer preferences, and a shift in investor priorities." Already, Europe's "directive on aviation and moves to bring maritime emissions into an international emissions reduction regime could significantly impact" South African air freight and shipping.

"Tourism is not just a potential victim of climate change, it also contributes to the causes of climate change," the *Green Paper* observes ominously. "South Africa is a carbon intensive destination, and relies extensively on long haul flights from key international tourism markets." New air taxes to slow climate change thus create 'significant risk' to SA tourism. Yet even though they were warned of this a decade ago, Transport Ministers Jeff Radebe and Sbu Ndebele pushed through an unnecessary new \$1 billion airport 40kms north of Durban, entirely lacking public transport access, even while all relevant authorities confirmed that South Durban's airport could easily have managed the incremental expansion.

Durban's pro-growth planners still exuberantly promote massively-subsidised 'economic development' strategies based on revived beach tourism (notwithstanding loss of coveted 'Blue Flag' status); mega-sports events to fill the 2010 Moses Mabhida White Elephant stadium; a dramatic port widening/deepening and a potential new dug-out harbour at the old airport site (or maybe instead more auto manufacturing); a competing new Dube trade port next to the King Shaka Airport; new long-distance air routes; expansion of South Durban's hated petrochemical complex; and a massive new Durban-Joburg oil pipeline and hence doubled refinery capacity. Perhaps it is high time the City Manager reconsidered his position on climate change.

This is yet more serious because the *Green Paper* passes the buck: "Most of our climate adaptation and much of the mitigation efforts will take place at provincial and municipal levels." Durban's dubious car-

bon market and offset deals – such as at the controversial Bisasar Road landfill in Clare Estate – dominate municipal policy. The *Green Paper* repeatedly endorsed "market-based policy measures" including carbon trading and offsets, at a time, in early 2011, that Europe's Emissions Trading Scheme completely collapsed due to internal fraud, external hacking and an extremely volatile carbon price, and the main US carbon market in Chicago had all but died.

South Africa's *Green Paper* authors obviously weren't paying attention to the markets, in arguing, "Limited availability of international finance for large scale fossil fuel infrastructure in developing countries is emerging as a potential risk for South Africa's future plans for development of new coal fired power stations." If so then why did Pretoria borrow \$3.75 billion from the World Bank, with around \$1 billion more expected in 2011-12 from the US Ex-Im Bank and \$1.75 billion raised from international bond markets? Indeed by March 2011, Eskom announced its \$40 billion financing portfolio was secure, because both South Africa's and the North's financiers continued to be as short-sighted about coal investments as they were about credit derivatives, real estate, dot.coms, emerging markets and the carbon markets.

The *Green Paper* is also laced with false solutions. For example, attempting to "kick start and stimulate the renewable energy industry" requires "Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects." Yet the miniscule €14/tonne currently being paid to the Durban methane-electricity conversion at three local landfills shows the futility of the CDM, not to mention the historic injustice of keeping Bisasar Road's dump (Africa's largest) open in spite of resident objections to environmental racism. Similarly dubious policy ideas include "a nuclear power station fleet with a potential of up to 10 GWh by 2035 with the first reactors being commissioned from 2022" and, just as dangerously, a convoluted waste incineration strategy that aims to "facilitate energy recovery" through "negotiation of appropriate carbon-offset funding."

Together, these kinds of commitments made South Africa an extremely dangerous threat to humanity and the planet whenever its representatives appeared in UN climate fora.

South Africa at the COPs

At the COPs in both Copenhagen and Cancún, as well as at prior meetings such as Nairobi in November 2006, South African leaders regularly let down their African colleagues as well as the global environment. Since South Africa is not listed as a country that must cut emissions in the first (1997-2012) stage of the Kyoto Protocol, the only binding global climate agreement, there was little resistance in Pretoria to signing on. When it came to the second stage, however, Pretoria has been part of the contradictory movement of large emerging economies that both want to retain Kyoto's North-South differentiation of responsibility to cut emissions, and to either gut Kyoto's binding targets or establish complicated offsets and carbon trades which would have the same effect.

The Nairobi summit helped set the tone, because Pretoria's environment minister at the time was Marthinus van Schalkwyk, formerly head of the New National Party, which from 1948-94 was the ruling party of apartheid. A new Adaptation Fund was established in Nairobi, but its resources were reliant upon CDM revenues, and Africa received only around 2 percent of these. But because of COP politicians' and CDM officials' increasing embrace of biofuels and GE timber, activists from the Gaia Foundation, Global Forest Coalition, the Global Justice Ecology Project, Large Scale Biofuels Action Group, the STOP GE Trees Campaign and World Rainforest Movement condemned the Nairobi summit. [20] Van Schalkwyk wrote in *Business Day* newspaper that South Africa achieved its key Nairobi objectives, including kick-starting the CDM in Africa, and welcomed UN support for more 'equitable distribution of CDM projects', concluding that this work 'sends a clear signal to carbon markets of our common resolve to secure the future of the Kyoto regime.' [21]

As if to disprove any intent on joining Kyoto's emissions cuts, just days later van Schalkwyk's Cabinet colleagues confirmed the largest industrial subsidies in African history – entailing a vast increase in coal fired electricity – for the proposed Coega smelter and export processing zone near Port Elizabeth on the Eastern Cape. Just over a year later, as electricity supplies suffered extensive load-shedding, the project ultimately failed in 2008, but the long-standing plan was for Rio Tinto to build a \$2.5 billion aluminium smelter with highly-subsidised electricity, and then to apply for CDM financing to subsidise the vast power input even further. [22] As one of South Africa's leading climate

scientists, Richard Fuggle, expressed it in his 2006 University of Cape Town retirement lecture:

It is rather pathetic that Van Schalkwyk has expounded the virtues of South Africa's 13 small projects to garner carbon credits under the Kyoto Protocol's CDM, but has not expressed dismay at Eskom selling 1360 megawatts a year of coal-derived electricity to a foreign aluminium company. We already have one of the world's highest rates of carbon emissions per dollar of GDP. Adding the carbon that will be emitted to supply power to this single factory will make us number one on this dubious league table. [23]

Given this background, it is telling that van Schalkwyk became, in March 2010, a leading candidate to run the UNFCCC. [24] My own view, as quoted in the press, was that "The UNFCCC post must be headed by someone of integrity, and that's not a characteristic associated with Van Schalkwyk, thanks to his chequered career as an apartheid student spy and a man who sold out his political party for a junior cabinet seat." And "If Van Schalkwyk was a world-class climate diplomat, why did Zuma demote him by removing his environment duties last year?" [25]

Earthlife Africa argued that as environment minister, van Schalkwyk "did not have a good record in cutting carbon emissions." [26] Indeed, judging by van Schalkwyk's silence when Eskom proposed huge new coal-fired plants and when bountiful cheap-electricity deals were offered to multinational corporations, he was demonstrably unfit to tackle the other big global polluters. It would have been an ironic, dysfunctional appointment in any case, because as tourism minister van Schalkwyk was blithely promoting more air travel to South Africa – and yet the UNFCCC will soon have to start putting carbon taxes on planes, as well as South African exports. On the last occasion he stood on the world climate stage, in 2007, van Schalkwyk enthusiastically promoted a global carbon market in Washington at the IETA meeting, which in a just world would have disqualified him from further international climate work. [27]

Although he did not get the job in the end, as Costa Rican carbon trader Christiana Figueres leap-frogged him at the last moment in May 2010 to get the job, van Schalkwyk did have strong supporters. According to an industry analysis:

A climate official from an unspecified government said that as a candidate, van Schalkwyk “would be acceptable to most people, so he should definitely be counted as a favourite.” Greenpeace Africa was “pleased to know Minister Van Schalkwyk is being considered and would be very confident that he would be equal to the task of replacing Mr. de Boer.... By all accounts, he has an excellent standing as a negotiator, and has earned a great deal of respect for being very engaged and informed... If he is appointed, developing countries, in particular, will have better access to him because he’s coming from a developing country.” [28]

After van Schalkwyk came Sonjica, and then in late 2010, her replacement Edna Molewa. In Cancún, Molewa slowed progress on getting binding emissions cuts, because, “We believe that it is quite important that as developing countries we also get an opportunity to allow development to happen because of poverty. We need to allow space for us to actually introduce those emissions [reductions] over time, because developed countries have gone through the processes.” [29] The ruse here was that South Africa’s extremely high emissions contributed to poverty-reduction, rather than the opposite.

It was also regrettable that Pretoria negotiators went to both Copenhagen and Cancún empowered by endorsements from the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace – alongside gullible climate journalists – who took at face value a vaguely-promised 34 percent emissions cut below anticipated 2020 levels. WWF called Sonjica’s Copenhagen strategy ‘very progressive’. [30] Michelle Ntab Ndiaye, the Africa director of Greenpeace – so effective with direct action protests involving pranks and aesthetically gripping imagery (instead of grassroots organizing) – termed SA a ‘star’ of Copenhagen. [31] In January 2010, according to Themba Linden of Greenpeace Africa, ‘The BASIC countries have to lead the world in light of no leadership from developed world’ – yet it was the BASIC countries which legitimized the Copenhagen Accord. [32] And in November 2010, in a Cancún warm-up negotiation session in China, Greenpeace’s Melita Steele remarked that Pretoria has a “fairly progressive [position] in the negotiations... quite an ambitious emissions reduction pledge.” [33]

The reality was shockingly different, however. Tristen Taylor of Earthlife Africa begged Pretoria for

details about the 34 percent pledge, and after two weeks of delays, learned Yawitch’s estimates were from a ‘Growth Without Constraint’ (GWC) scenario. According to Taylor, “GWC is fantasy, essentially an academic exercise to see how much carbon South Africa would produce given unlimited resources and cheap energy prices.” Officials had already conceded GWC was “neither robust nor plausible” eighteen months ago, leading Taylor to conclude, “The SA government has pulled a public relations stunt.” [34] After all, emissions cuts promised in the *Long-Term Mitigation Scenario* would not prevent the 2010-20 construction of the world’s fourth and third largest coal-fired powerplants, respectively, Medupi and Kusile.

Did Zuma know what he was doing, acting in Copenhagen on behalf of major mining/metals corporations, which keep SA’s ruling party lubricated with cash, ‘black economic empowerment’ deals and jobs for cronies, and which need higher SA carbon emissions so as to continue receiving the world’s cheapest electricity, and which then export their profits to London and Melbourne? Perhaps, but on the other hand, two other explanations – ignorance and cowardice – were, eight years earlier, Zuma’s plausible defenses for promoting AIDS denialism. He helped Mbeki during the period in which 330,000 South Africans died due to Pretoria’s refusal to supply anti-retroviral medicines (as a Harvard Public Health School study showed). [35]

To his credit, Zuma reversed course by 2003 (late in the day) and endorsed public supply of AIDS medicines, as public pressure arose from the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and its international allies. TAC continued to condemn Zuma, however, on grounds associated with his notorious sexual politics, including misogyny during his 2006 rape trial. [36] But it is that sort of intensive pressure that the main local activist network, Climate Justice Now! South Africa, must repeat, or otherwise permit Zuma to remain a signatory to a far worse genocide. Unfortunately, rising activist pressure in early 2010 failed in a similar mission: to prevent financing and construction of the world’s fourth-largest coal-fired power plant, Medupi.

Medupi Coal Corruption

We learn a great deal about South African climate politics by examining a crucial campaign – unsuccessful in the short term – which entailed fighting the World Bank’s fast-growing coal portfolio. On April 8 2010, after nearly two months of strenuous lobbying against more fossil fuel credits, the Bank Board approved a \$3.75 billion loan to the South African electricity utility Eskom. Its main purpose (for which \$3.1 billion was allocated) was construction of a power station that will pump 25-30 megatonnes of CO₂ into the atmosphere annually, more than the output of 115 countries. Paying for Medupi will require a 127 percent real price increase from 2007-12 for South African household electricity consumers (to nearly \$0.15/kiloWatt hour). [37]

The loan was a last-minute request, as the 2008-09 global financial turmoil dried up Eskom’s potential private sector financing. As a result, it was only in December 2009 that South African civil society activated local and global networks against the loan, starting with a groundWork/Earthlife briefing document in December 2009. Within three months, more than 200 organisations across the world had endorsed a critique of the loan. [38]

South Durban activists launched the local public campaign on February 16 2010 with a spirited protest at Eskom’s main local branch. South Durban was an epicentre of protest against fossil fuels, given that it hosted the largest and least responsible petrochemical firms south of the Niger Delta. With electricity prices soaring, many more residents in South Durban were being disconnected. They often reconnect illegally and as Eskom and the municipality clamped down, the result was more social strife, in a country with what is probably the world’s highest rate of community protest.[39] To establish a campaign against an obscure World Bank loan so quickly, with the purpose of generating a crisis of confidence at the World Bank and in Pretoria, required clarity of message, an explicit demand (‘stop Medupi financing’) and a variety of issue-linkages to pull various constituencies into a coalition.

As always, the question is: who wins and who loses? First, the source areas of the coal for Medupi are highly contaminated by mercury and acid-mine drainage, with air, land, vegetables, animals and people’s health at much greater risk. Forty new coal mines in impoverished areas of Limpopo and Mpumalanga

provinces will be opened to provide inputs to Medupi and its successor, Kusile. This will create a few coal sector jobs (hence receiving endorsement from the National Union of Mineworkers), but a great many jobs in agriculture and tourism will be lost as a result of the invasive mining activity and downstream degradation. Medupi itself will be built in a water-scarce area where communities are already confronting extreme mining pollution and, even though an air-cooled model (Africa’s first) was chosen, the cost of supplying an additional water-cooling supply amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars, given the long transport and pumping costs.

Once the coal is burned and electricity generated, the winners and losers become even more divergent. Medupi’s main beneficiaries will be the world’s largest metals and mining corporations, especially BHP Billiton (Melbourne based) and various Anglo American subsidiaries (most reporting to London), which already receive the world’s cheapest electricity thanks to multi-decade deals. Anger soon grew about the huge discounts made when secret, forty-year ‘Special Pricing Agreements’ were offered by Eskom during late apartheid, when the firm had a third too much excess capacity due to the long South African economic decline.

These agreements were finally leaked in March 2010 and disclosed that BHP Billiton and Anglo were receiving the world’s cheapest electricity, at less than \$0.02/kWh (whereas the overall corporate price was around \$0.05/kWh, still the world’s cheapest, and the consumer price was around \$0.10/kWh). In early April, just before the Bank decision, Eskom announced that a small modification was made to BHP Billiton’s contract price but it was reportedly to the firm’s ‘advantage’. Finally, however, the Australian based mining house was sufficiently intimidated by the glare of publicity that in October 2010 Deutsche Bank mining analysts predicted BHP would dispose of Richards Bay assets. According to *Business Day* ‘The reason for selling the aluminium smelters would be the scrutiny under which BHP’s electricity contracts have come amid demands for resource companies to use less power.’ [40]

An additional problem with BHP and Anglo as beneficiaries is the outflow of profits to Melbourne and London, at a time South Africa’s current account deficit made it the world’s most risky middle-income country, according to *The Economist* (25 February 2009). Moreover, South Africa had an existing \$75 billion foreign

debt which would have escalated by five percent with the ratio of foreign debt to GDP would by 2011 rise to the same level as was reached in 1985, when a debt crisis compelled a default (on \$13 billion). [41] That was the signal, incidentally, that business and banking were finally breaking ranks with the apartheid regime. [42]

Another controversial aspect of the loan was the Bank's articulation of the privatization agenda. The confirmation that Eskom would offer private generating capacity to Independent Power Producers was established in loan documentation, in relation to the renewable component, advancing Eskom's desire to privatize 30 percent of generating capacity (including a 49 percent private share in Kusile, although no private interest had been expressed for Medupi). This component attracted explicit opposition from trade unions – especially the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa – and consumers. [43]

Corruption was another feature that generated critiques of the World Bank by South African opposition political parties (especially the centre-left Independent Democrats and liberal Democratic Alliance, which subsequently merged) and the influential liberal *Business Day* newspaper. [44] These organizations opposed the loan because contrary to supposed Bank anti-corruption policies, it will directly fund African National Congress (ANC) ruling party coffers. Medupi will be built with Hitachi boilers that in turn kick back between \$10 and \$100 million (the amount is still unclear) thanks to an ANC investment in Hitachi. As the Eskom-Hitachi deal was signed, the Eskom chairperson (and former environment minister), Valli Moosa, was also a member of the ANC's finance committee. A government investigation released in March 2010 found his conduct in this conflict of interest to be 'improper'. [45] The ANC promised to sell the investment stake, but this dragged on and in late 2010 was still not complete. Ironically, in February 2010, the Bank had issued a major statement alongside its annual African Development Indicators, entitled *Quiet Corruption*, in which it blamed African teachers and healthcare workers for moonlighting (a result of Bank structural adjustment policies). [46] Were there justice in the Bank, the Medupi loan could have been a core case study.

Ironically, in December 2010, the World Bank's website headlined news about the "Corruption Hunters" conference, with Zoellick pronouncing, "Stealing is

bad enough, ripping off the poor is disgusting." [47] An aside on the Bank's hunt for corruption is therefore tempting, because it was perfectly logical for Zoellick to have hired as the head of his anti-corruption unit a top political operator for South Africa's machiavellian former president Mbeki. Leonard McCarthy was involved in an apparently illegal conspiracy to undermine the subsequent president, Zuma, simply to play politics. [48]

And in relation to the Bank in South Africa, the matter of historic racial injustice could not be ignored. The World Bank's financing of apartheid began just three years after the 1948 election of the Afrikaners' Nationalist Party, lasting through 1967, and included \$100 million for Eskom. [49] During that period, the Bank financed the supply of electricity to no black households (who only began receiving electricity in 1980), and instead empowered only white businesses and residences.

Curiously, South African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan argued, on April 1 2010, that 'South Africa, in 16 years of democracy, never has had to take any loans from the World Bank... This is an opportunity for the World Bank to build a relationship with South Africa.' [50] Yet the Bank's 1999 and 2008 'Country Assistance Strategy' documents show conclusively that Medupi is the 15th credit since 1994. [51] As for 'building a relationship', Gordhan also neglected that the Bank co-authored the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (homegrown structural adjustment) programme, whose orthodox strategies failed and which led South Africa to overtake Brazil as the world's most unequal major country, not to mention more than a dozen other major interventions in social and economic policy. [52]

Indeed the Bank itself regularly bragged about its 'Knowledge Bank' role in South Africa, and in 1999, for example, after Bank economist John Roome suggested to then water minister Kader Asmal that the government impose 'a credible threat of cutting service' to people who could not afford water at the supplier's cost, the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy reported that its 'market-related pricing' advice was 'instrumental in facilitating a radical revision in SA's approach'. [53] As a result, the cholera epidemic the following year – catalysed by water disconnections near Richards Bay – killed hundreds. [54] One can safely predict that, given the price increases faced by elect-

ricity customers, parallel misery will follow the Bank's Medupi loan.

The Bisasar Road CDM

One of the most obvious strategic orientations of the South African government is carbon trading. To illustrate the controversies, in April 2010 the Medupi power plant was proposed by Eskom officials as a potential CDM project, in spite of the enormous eco-social resistance that arose to its financing by a World Bank loan. [55] In the same spirit, in 2009, an attempt by Sasol to claim that a gas pipeline investment was 'additional' to existing plans (hence deserving emissions reductions credits) was ridiculed by the Johannesburg activist group Earthlife Africa, and did not pass muster in the UN vetting process. [56]

But the most controversial was South Africa's single largest CDM project, a methane-electricity conversion at Bisasar Road dump in Durban's Clare Estate residential neighborhood, which processes 5000 tonnes of solid waste a day and is Africa's largest formal landfill. The struggle of Sajida Khan (1952-2007), a self-taught ecologist, is instructive for any of us worried about the climate. Attempting to shut the dump that ultimately killed her, Khan dedicated half her life to a contest with international corporations, the World Bank and inconsiderate municipal bureaucrats. [57]

She was raised in what was the traditionally Indian neighbourhood within Clare Estate, astride a nature reserve that spanned a small valley. In 1980, when Khan was 28, her surroundings were suddenly destroyed by apartheid officials. The peaceful reserve became an unending, stinking heap of rubbish, which until the late 1990s also included a medical waste incinerator. Khan believed that the neighborhood's involuntary receipt of overwhelmingly wealthy white Durbanites' droppings was the root cause of her two cancer cases, the latter of which was fatal. The reason that Bisasar Road dump was not closed in the early 2000s notwithstanding a very substantial pressure campaign by Khan and 6000 residents, was a commitment by the World Bank to invest a potential \$14.4 million grant in a CDM project to convert landfill methane emissions into electricity. [58]

With at least another 15 years of life left in the dump before it reached its maximum possible height, Durban officials (white men) celebrated the Bank's interest at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Devel-

opment by ignoring the clamour (mainly by black women) to close it. The officials aimed to draw out the methane, burn and flare it (with associated incineration hazards) so as to power turbines and link the resulting electricity back into the municipal grid. The 'win-win' strategy to capture the dump's escaping methane – a greenhouse gas at least twenty times more potent than CO₂ – would require the CDM subsidy so as to compete with South Africa's cheap coal-fired national electricity grid.

Community opposition to the Bank's CDM and demands for Bisasar Road's closure were not universal. Apartheid segregated South Africa's four main race groups into different areas. In addition to people of Indian origin like Khan, Clare Estate also hosts thousands of poor 'African' and working-class 'coloured' residents. The Khan family built their middle-class house in the 1950s on Clare Road. Some members of the family still reside in the house overlooking (to the west) the dump, directly in the path of prevailing winds which continually coat the area with light landfill dust and disease-carrying flies. As logical as the closure demand is, given the history of environmental racism, there are nevertheless conflicting opinions about how to handle this menacing neighbor. Starting in early 2005, the Abahlali baseMjondolo ('shackdwellers') movement of Kennedy Road – also directly adjoining the landfill, to the north – did an extraordinary job struggling against adverse conditions and police repression (until in September 2009 many of the leaders were driven away after violent attacks). But throughout the 2000s, the Kennedy Road shackdwellers welcomed the opportunity to have several dozen of their members pick rubbish and informally recycle it while on the dump. Scores more shackdwellers once informally picked materials from the dump, until the municipality's Durban Solid Waste limited access due to safety and health dangers.

There was not unity in this community, for Kennedy Road leaders accused Khan of threatening livelihoods and sabotaging the city's offer of a handful of jobs and bursaries (in Uganda) in the event the CDM project got off the ground. [59] Khan had used the word 'informals' to describe the shack settlement residents and once advocated that they be compensated and moved to areas nearby (as she herself desired for her family) sufficiently far from dump (she recommended a buffer for all residents of 800 meters), to be

from the windswept dust. At the nearby clinic, health workers confirmed that Kennedy Road residents suffer severely from asthma, sinusitis, pneumonia and even tuberculosis. The toxic body load is unknown, but the Cancer Society of South Africa deemed the area a 'cancer hotspot' because of the heavy metals and other dangerous substances that penetrate the water, air and shifting soils. Khan had a profound empathy for people in the same proximity as cancer-causing and respiratory disease particulates, as she noted in an interview: 'Recently a woman was buried alive. She died on the site [picking rubbish, killed by a dump truck of-flooding]. I could have saved her life.' [60]

In contrast, for John Parkin, deputy head of the engineering at Durban Solid Waste, 'What makes (the Bisasar Road CDM project) worthwhile is the revenue that can be earned from carbon credits', estimated at 3.1 million certified emissions reduction credits, worth about \$15 million, along with some 6-8 megaWatts of electricity over a 20 year lifespan. In late 2006, the French Development Agency pledge [61] d long-term loans of \$8 million to Durban's landfill gas projects (Bisasar is by far the largest of three), alongside the \$1.3 million extended by South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry.

The World Bank had backed off in 2005 when Khan's fame was at her height – e.g. the lead paragraph in the *Washington Post's* analysis of the Kyoto Protocol when it came into effect that year [62] was about Khan's battle against CDMs – but still billed itself as a potential financier for the project. In 2008, the Bank was replaced by an investment company, Tradings Emissions, which acquired the right to purchase one million emissions reduction credits. The firm's investment advisor Simon Shaw termed Bisasar and the other two landfills 'an important project, it is operational, it has a long term future and we anticipate registration shortly. These credits will be a useful addition to our portfolio.' In March 2009, the municipality registered it on the United Nations list of CDM projects, as active through at least 2014. [63]

The four million cubic meters of potential Bisasar Road rubbish that is today's remaining capacity – on top of 19 million cubic meters in the dump that are already exuding methane – will allow extraction of methane and damaging on-site conversion of electricity for many years to come. Khan believed that the gas should indeed be removed, but through nearby gas

pipes, not burned and flared on site. Khan's goal of Bisasar Road's immediate closure with conversion of the gas for industrial use a long way from residential areas could have been achieved were there better financing systems available than the unstable carbon market.

Khan's surviving relatives are bitter about their multiple losses, and miss Khadija's energy for and love of resistance to environmental injustice. Sometimes accused of waging her battle because of a selfish interest, her family's declining property value, Khan rebutted, 'No, no. It's to do with pollution, and it transcends race and colour'. [64] Yet there were certainly class and, to some extent, race and gender power relations at play – all of which were shaped by capital accumulation at municipal, national and global scales.

For example, as Khan struggled for life, the toxic economy of Bisasar Road was being rebuilt by the Durban municipality with the global capitalist master's CDM tool. The campaign to close apartheid's dump may ultimately fail as a result of the various post-apartheid forces whose interaction now generates overlapping, interlocking, eco-social and personal tragedies. Still, if inhaling status quo pollution meant paying dearly with her health for so many years, Khan died knowing she had been partially successful: at least temporarily preventing a major World Bank investment and raising local/global consciousness.

Most importantly, she left us with a drive to transcend the inherited conditions and mindsets into which apartheid categories have cemented infrastructures and people. But pessimistically, and realistically, without Khan's energy and talent, it was infeasible for Clare Estate residents from different and sometimes opposed race/class backgrounds to forge more effective alliances against the municipality, at least not in the short-term. It was only a matter of time before global capitalist processes rolled over citizen opposition to Bisasar Road, facilitated by the money-hungry, neoliberal municipality, joined by Pretoria and Paris.

Power to the People

The ordinary Sowetan working-class electricity consumer offers us a good case study of climate politics, because of extraordinary political mobilisations that have occurred in the Johannesburg 'South Western Townships' (Soweto), including the student rising of 1976. In the same spirit, using the same rhetoric and

songs, a new movement against extreme electricity price increases arose in 2000, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee. The potential for Soweto civics to address issues beyond their immediate community by tracing the production of a basic need – such as water from Lesotho dams to privatised municipal water to substandard sewage systems [65] – has been remarked upon often. But the particular conditions of electricity commodification in relation to climate have enormous potential.

Sowetans experienced high price increases due to a huge reduction in central-local state subsidies during the 1990s, 85 percent in real terms according to the Financial and Fiscal Commission. [66] As the subsidies ebbed and as Eskom followed its mandate for “cost-reflexive tariffs”, an estimated ten million people were victims of electricity disconnections after apartheid, and in the early 2000s, the rate increased dramatically. [67]

This process of electricity commodification was first posed in an apartheid-era (1986) *White Paper on Energy Policy* which called for the ‘highest measure of freedom for the operation of market forces’, the involvement of the private sector, a shift to a market-oriented system with a minimum of state control and involvement, and deregulation of pricing, marketing and production. After apartheid was replaced in 1994, similar language was found in the *Urban Development Strategy* (1995), the *Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework* (1997 and 2001), and the *Energy White Paper* (1998). The latter called for ‘cost-reflective’ electricity tariffs so as to limit any potential subsidy from industry to consumers. [68]

Asked why cross-subsidization of electricity prices to benefit the poor was not being considered, the state’s leading infrastructure-services official explained, ‘If we increase the price of electricity to users like Alusaf [a major aluminum exporter owned by BHP Billiton], their products will become uncompetitive and that will affect our balance of payments’. [69] (BHP Billiton paid approximately one tenth the price that retail consumers do, without factoring in the ecological price of cheap power at the site of production and in the coal-gathering and burning process).

Rising electricity prices across South African townships had a negative impact during the late 1990s, evident in declining use of electricity despite an increase in the number of connections. According to Sta-

tistics South Africa, households using electricity for lighting increased from 63.5 percent in 1995 to 69.8 percent in 1999. However, households using electricity for cooking declined from 55.4 percent to 53.0 percent, and households using electricity for heating dropped from 53.8 percent in 1995 to just 48.0 percent in 1999. The state agency conceded a significant link between decreasing usage and the increasing price of electricity. [70]

Most poor South Africans still rely for a large part of their lighting, cooking and heating energy needs upon paraffin (with its burn-related health risks), coal (with high levels of domestic household and township-wide air pollution) and wood (with dire consequences for deforestation). The use of dirty sources of energy has negative consequences especially for women’s health leading to respiratory diseases and eye problems. This is because women, are traditionally responsible for managing the home; they are more affected by the high cost of electricity, and spend greater time and resources searching for alternative energy. Ecologically-sensitive energy sources, such as solar, wind and tidal, have barely begun to be explored, notwithstanding the enormous damage done by South Africa’s addiction to fossil-fuel consumption.

Neoliberal pricing principles and the consequent policy of mass disconnections prevented the widespread redistribution required to make Eskom’s mass electrification feasible. As protests began in earnest from 1997 and the African National Congress witnessed rising apathy before the 2000 municipal elections, the ruling party introduced a ‘Free Basic Services’ monthly package of 50 kWh of electricity per household, but Eskom delayed implementation and the amount proved far too little, and disconnections increased. [71]

Eskom continued to be the target of criticism, especially from environmentalists who complain that coal burning plants lack sufficient sulphur scrubbing equipment and that alternative renewable energy investments have been negligible. Moreover, labor opposition mounted. Having fired more than 40, 000 of its 85, 000 employees during the early 1990s, thanks to mechanisation and overcapacity, the utility tried to outsource and corporatize several key operations, resulting in periodic national anti-privatisation strikes by the trade union federation.

But it was in Soweto that the resistance became

world famous and internationally networked. In 2001, domestic consumers paid an average price to Eskom of US\$0.03 cents per kWh, while the manufacturing and mining sectors paid only half that amount. Two years earlier, in 1999, Soweto residents had experienced three increases – amounting to 47 percent – in a short period as Eskom brought tariffs in line with other areas. [72] This reflected the move towards ‘cost reflectivity’ and away from regulated price increases, in order to reduce and eventually eliminate subsidies, so as to achieve ‘market-related returns sufficient to attract new investors into the industry’, said Eskom. [73]

When prices became unaffordable and payment arrears began to mount, Eskom’s first strategy was disconnection and repression. Eskom decided in 2001 to disconnect households whose arrears were more than \$800, with payment more than 120 days overdue. An anticipated 131,000 households in Soweto were to be cut off due to non-payment, according to Eskom, even though the company had only 126,000 recorded consumers in the township. [74] Johannesburg Metro authorities decided, in an act of solidarity, to cut off water and began evictions selling off residents’ houses in order to recoup the debts owed, in an attempt to pressure people to pay Eskom arrears. [75] A survey of Soweto residents found that 61 percent of households had experienced electricity disconnections, of whom 45 percent had been cut off for more than one month. A random, stratified national survey conducted by the Municipal Services Project and Human Sciences Research Council found that ten million people across South Africa had experienced electricity cutoffs. [76]

The impact of disconnections can be fatal. One indication of the health implications of electricity denial and of supply cuts was the upsurge in TB rates, as respiratory illnesses are carried by particulates associated with smoke from wood, coal and paraffin. Because of climate and congestion, respiratory diseases are particularly common in Soweto. In a 1998 survey, two in five Sowetans reportedly suffered from respiratory problems. [77] Survey respondents reported many fires in the neighborhood, often caused by paraffin stoves, many of which were harmful to children. Eskom’s disconnection procedures often resulted in electricity cables lying loose in the streets. [78] Residents were unhappy not only about the high reconnection fees charged but the fact that Eskom used outsourced companies that earn \$10 per household dis-

connection. No notification was given that supply would be cut off, and residents were not given time to rectify payments problems. Eskom can disconnect entire blocks at a time by removing circuit breakers, penalizing those who do pay their bills along with those who don’t.

All these grievances provided the raw material from which the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and its Operation Khanyisa emerged, a point we take up in the final chapter, along with a critical look at the way more explicit climate justice movement-building from below has worked in some of the main sites of struggle.

South Africa’s interlinked climate-energy-economic travesties can only be reversed by grassroots and labor activism. At the Durban COP 17, don’t expect a global deal that can save the planet, given prevailing adverse power relations. Instead of relying on inept politicians and bureaucrats, South Africa’s environmental, community, women’s, youth and labor voices will be demanding serious action to address the greatest crisis of our times:

- major investments in Green Jobs would let metalworkers weld millions of solar-powered geysers, for example, thus allowing Eskom to switch off power to BHP Billiton’s aluminum smelters and to halt new powerplant construction without net job loss;
- new public transport subsidies should reconfigure apartheid-era urban design and pull us willingly from single-occupant cars;
- an employment-rich zero-waste strategy would recycle nearly everything and compost our organic waste so as to eliminate methane emissions at the remaining landfills;
- more direct-action protests against major emissions point sources – Eskom, Sasol (apartheid’s wicked coal-to-oil company), the Engen refinery in South Durban and the new Durban-Joburg oil mega-pipeline, for instance – should better link micro-environmental struggles over local air, water and land quality to climate change;
- more ambitious Air Quality Act regulations would label – and then phase out – carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gas ‘pollutants’, as with the US Clean Air Act;
- government planning and utility board decisions would halt willy-nilly suburbanisation and un-

green 'development'; and

- instead of North-South financing via destructive carbon markets, the demand for 'climate debt' would permit the flow of strings-free, non-corrupt and effective adaptation funds.

Through urgent adoption of genuine post-carbon strategies like these, by the time of the COP 17 in November 2011, the world might have seen in Durban a state and society committed to reversing climate change.

The Durban COP

The exceptional record of climate injustice and rather ineffectual resistance left South Africa's CJ movement prospects somewhat limited in the run-up to the Durban COP 17. In January 2011 the activists considered a process of unification with Climate Action Network members whose highest-profile local members were the branch of the conservative World Wildlife Fund (a group on record favouring both the SA negotiating position and carbon trading) and the rather fluid, self-interested Greenpeace, led by Durban-born Kumi Naidoo.

Comparisons to the prior two hosts are interesting, in part because of prospects for CJ movement building that rose in Denmark in 2009 but fell back in Mexico in 2010, largely due to a politically-splintered and geographically fragmented oppositional terrain. Civil society looked forward to the South African host function because of the need to publicise and change so many local policies, practices and projects, as well as the strong cadreship of activists with summit-protest experience from 2001 in Durban and 2002 in Johannesburg.

But compared to the two prior events, there were some important differences that would shape the COP given its South African context. First, unlike in Denmark, the Pretoria government wouldn't consider giving funding to its green-red critics to set up an independent counter-summit site, but would instead attempt to funnel civilised society into an area immediately adjacent to the Durban International Convention Centre (ICC). There, delegates would face extreme, badge-based access controls to negotiations (unlike Copenhagen's Bella Centre managers, who allowed in registered civil society groups until three days before the climax, but then U-turned and rejected even Climate Action Now's presence).

Of course that ICC space would be tamed. The SA government's idea of civil society is highly-regulated civilised society, or loyalist civil society, and when protests about the environment and local socio-economic grievances emerge, the SA government regularly villifies – and sometimes represses – the critics (or just ignores them). For example, Durban municipality officials regularly reject – with banal explanations – civil society applications for mass protest marches, although to be balanced, it must be said that the SA police have never shown the capacity to kettle or break up large marches, as witnessed in Copenhagen, or successfully infiltrate leading activist groups (as has been revealed recently in the Mark Kennedy case).

As we have seen already, while perfecting the crucial narrative art of 'talk left in order to walk right' (as Frantz Fanon showed is so typical of African nationalism in *The Wretched of the Earth*), South Africa's government typically hosts major summits – the World Conference Against Racism and World Summit on Sustainable Development are the main comparative examples – in ways that amplify the world elites' most conservative power relations (e.g. lining up pro-Zionist and anti-reparations in 2001 and pro-privatisation in 2002). Thus they are also the target of local protesters. As a result, the society's view of the UNFCCC – and the UN role in general – is far less hopeful than Denmark's was, in part because global-governance strategies (with the exception of exempting AIDS medicines from World Trade Organisation control at Doha in 2001) are generally understood to complement not contradict Western imperialism, especially in relation to Africa. But this tends to be impressionistic, not at the level of detailed anger expressed by citizenries at the Copenhagen Accord signing in December 2009. At the level of broader society, while a substantial share of Copenhagen residents, Danes and nearby Europeans, especially youth, realised what was at stake and joined the proceedings, in both South Africa and Mexico, the levels of popular participation in climate debates (and knowledge of the crisis) are much lower.

Instead, there is more desperate fury in these sites at the degeneration of state services, hence South Africa's pride of place amongst the highest protest rates in the world. Given that Pretoria has imposed an extreme local climate/energy crisis on its subjects – massive coal-fired plants generating power for large aluminium and mining firms with exploitative electricity

price increases to the under-accessed poor – and makes only token efforts to develop renewable energy and practically no efforts (except an elite fast train) at improving public transport, the Durban COP would not be a friendly place. Local activists' *modus operandi* include building mass mobilisations with very radical rhetoric and substantial marches and demonstrations (albeit not as many as were gathered in Copenhagen in December 2009), as well as more surgical policy critiques. But local organisations lack either the symbolic orientation of European NGOs' banner hangs, flash mobs and other media-savvy tactics, or, on the other end of the spectrum, the black bloc of militant anarchist/autonomist groups. Because of that, the movement below is critically important in this setting, in a way it wasn't in Copenhagen or Cancún.

Paralysis above was anticipated to continue. The hyped expectations of 'Hopenhagen' were no longer a factor since no one had any sense that Durban would either extend Kyoto or give the Copenhagen Accord sufficient teeth to address the crisis properly. Even the man with most to win or lose from perceived progress in Durban, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, shifted focus to a potential 2012 deal at the Rio+20 gathering in Brazil. According to his assistant Robert Orr, "It is very evident that there will not be a single grand deal at any point in the near future."

At the level of Durban's fine detail, no one would justifiably expect the North to deliver a useful funding mechanism and actual binding commitments, given the reactionary character of all the key governments, plus the rising capacity of the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (an increase from IBSA days) – to foil cutback commitments. It was no secret that since the end of 2009, the elites' primary strategic vehicle for reducing emissions, the carbon market, was in the doldrums (in part because the Copenhagen Accord had no legitimacy). Although one of the crucial functions of Cancún was to re-legitimise emissions trading, and although was done in theory but not in practice (as witnessed by ongoing chaos in the European Emissions Trading Scheme), the carbon markets were still incapable of performing feats such as paying for forest conservation and transferring half the \$100 billion/year of adaptation funds to the South promised in Copenhagen by 2020.

Moreover, since 2010 the world became more acutely aware of the devastating roles of two Washing-

ton institutions – the World Bank (after the Medupi loan) and the US State Department (after WikiLeaks revelations). As for hosting responsibilities, the South African government could be expected to repeat the Danes' inept, inexperienced and ideologically confused facilitation, inadequate to the task of bridging vast political divides. As in 2001 and 2002, Pretoria should in 2011 avoid following blindly Washington's whims and global business rhetoric. If Pretoria failed to assert itself, the result: further elite delegitimation and further responsibility on civil society to generate genuine solutions.

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In service to the new South African government from 1994-2002, Patrick authored/edited more than a dozen policy papers, including the *Reconstruction and Development Programme*. He has lectured at more than 70 universities across the world, with formal academic affiliations in the US, Canada, Zimbabwe, Hungary, Korea, Japan and South Africa. Patrick earned his doctorate in economic geography under the supervision of David Harvey at Johns Hopkins in 1993, after studying finance at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School and economics at Swarthmore College.

ORATION I

Inaugural Address: Goodluck Jonathan

29 May 2011

A Promise of Transformational Leadership

Current scholarship in rhetoric and leadership in Africa has suggested that in the last decade, Africa has witnessed what has been termed as incidental leadership: a contradistinction from the transformational leadership required to lead Africa into what was envisaged by Africa's founding fathers. Fifty years after one of the earliest countries in West Africa received its independence, a president promised transformational leadership. What does it take to transform country like Nigeria from its current state, into a country imagined by transformational scholars or even politicians? Nigeria's potential for transformation is undeniably present, but can a government really harness that potential and put it to good use? Perhaps, that is the task that Nigeria's current president is set to undertake.



Does he really know what he is promising? Promise, for speech acts scholars is not some kind of 'cough out', neither is it a 'mere talk' as most politicians use it. It is an act. In his inaugural address, Goodluck employs a rhetorical device called *repetitio* (repetition) to reinforce and reiterate for the listener his intention to transform ('sacrifice to transform', 17, 'decidedly transformative', 19, 'enlist as agents of transformation', 20, 'time for transformation', 34, "join hands to begin the transformation of our country, 39). In paragraph 34 of the speech, Goodluck identifies what rhetoricians would call the *kairos* moment (opportune time for appropriate action): 'The time for lamentation is over. This is the time for transformation. This is the time for Action.' (34). To make a promise in an inaugural address is to initialise a national hope that if not fulfilled is rolled over to future governments to achieve.

The inaugural address has a special place in political transition processes which makes it mandatory for politicians to be extremely careful about the kinds of statements they make during campaigns and especially, the inaugural address. Bound by the promise he made during his campaign and the inaugural address, the American president is struggling to convince the American people that he is fulfilling the promises that he made before his election into office. This is where rhetoric assumes the role of shaping the nation: identification, promise and fulfilment. Dr Segun Ige [2009: 253], asserts :'

The inaugural address is a testimonial of trust, acceptance of a vote of confidence bestowed by a nation, and for the poor, a signal of hope for a better time ahead and a new order. The text carries not only rhetorical, but also economic, social and futuristic values that are implicit in a single performance. The inaugural address can also be conceived as a seal of public's endorsement of the presidency since the people must have graciously constituted the context for the hegemony of the president to be produced in the first place.'

It would seem that the president, Dr Jonathan Goodluck, possesses necessary credentials to achieve transformation if only Nigeria's ancestral and primordial forces that have hitherto swerved the sail of a well endowed nation into pure economic wreckage and moral disaster would for once be merciful. Notwithstanding, Nigeria is already on a recovery trajectory, all that is required of Goodluck is to ensure the maintenance and management of the dynamics of transformation and recovery and he would have achieved his goals. If the name carries any onomastic ontology that Nigerians so much believe in, like his name suggests: goodluck on the transformation project!

1. My Dear Compatriots, I stand in humble gratitude to you, this day, having just sworn to the oath of office as President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of our great nation.
2. I thank you all, fellow citizens, for the trust and confidence, which you have demonstrated through the power of your vote. I want to assure you, that I will do my utmost at all times, to continue to deserve your trust.
3. I would like to specially acknowledge the presence in our midst today, of Brother Heads of State and Government, who have come to share this joyous moment with us. Your Excellencies, I thank you for your solidarity. I also wish to express my gratitude, to the Representatives of Heads of State and Government who are here with us. My appreciation also goes to the chairperson of the African Union and other world leaders, our development partners, and all our distinguished guests.

4. I want to specially thank all Nigerians for staying the course in our collective commitment to build a democratic nation. To members of the PDP family and members of other political parties, who have demonstrated faith in our democratic enterprise, I salute you.

5. At this juncture, let me acknowledge and salute my friend and brother, Vice-President Namadi Sambo; and my dear wife, Patience, who has been a strong pillar of support.

6. I thank her for galvanizing and mobilizing Nigerian women for the cause of democracy. In the same vein, I owe a debt of gratitude to my mother and late father. I cannot thank them enough.

7. I cannot but pay tribute to our late President, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, with whom we won the Presidential election four years ago, when I contested as his running mate. May God bless his soul.

8. I also wish to pay tribute to our founding fathers, whose enduring sacrifices and abiding faith in the unity and greatness of our country, laid the foundation for the nation. We take enormous pride in their contributions. The pivotal task of this generation is to lift our fatherland to the summit of greatness.

9. Your Excellencies, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, earlier this year, over seventy-three million eligible Nigerians endured all manner of inconvenience just to secure their voters cards, in order to exercise the right to choose those that will govern them.

10. At the polls, we saw the most dramatic expressions of the hunger for democracy. Stories of courage and patriotism were repeated in many ways, including how fellow citizens helped physically challenged voters into polling stations to enable them exercise their franchise. The inspiring story of the one hundred and three year-old man, and many like him across the country, who struggled against the physical limitations of age to cast their vote, is noteworthy.

11. Such determination derives from the typical Nigerian spirit of resilience in the face of the greatest of odds. That spirit has, over the years, stirred our hopes, doused our fears, and encouraged us to gather ourselves to build a strong nation even when others doubted our capacity.

12. Today, our unity is firm, and our purpose is strong. Our determination unshakable. Together, we will unite our nation and improve the living standards of all our peoples whether in the North or in the South; in the East or in the West. Our decade of development has begun. The march is on. The day of transformation begins today. We will not allow anyone exploit differences in creed or tongue, to set us one against another. Let me at this point congratulate the elected Governors, Senators,

members of the House of Representatives and those of the States Houses of Assembly for their victories at the polls.

13. I am mindful that I represent the shared aspiration of all our people to forge a united Nigeria: a land of justice, opportunity and plenty. Confident that a people that are truly committed to a noble ideal, cannot be denied the realization of their vision, I assure you that this dream of Nigeria, that is so deeply felt by millions, will indeed come to reality.

14. A decade ago, it would have been a mere daydream to think that a citizen from a minority ethnic group could galvanize national support, on an unprecedented scale, to discard ancient prejudices, and win the people's mandate as President of our beloved country. That result emanated from the toil and sacrifice of innumerable individuals and institutions, many of whom may never get to receive public appreciation for their effort.

15. Only a couple of days ago, I received an entry on my Facebook page. It was sent by Mr. Babajide Orevba. He wrote to inform me that I had lost a great fan. That fan was his father, Mr. Emmanuel Bamidele Orevba. The deceased, the son told me, was no politician, but had campaigned enthusiastically for my ticket. Tragically, overwhelmed by the joy of our victory, he collapsed, and passed on three days later. I pray God Almighty to grant his soul eternal rest.

16. The success of the 2011 elections and the widespread acclaim which the exercise received was due to the uncommon patriotism and diligence exhibited by many Nigerians, including members of the Armed Forces, National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) and others. Unfortunately, despite the free, fair and transparent manner the elections were conducted, a senseless wave of violence in some parts of the country led to the death of ten members of the NYSC and others. These brave men and women paid the supreme sacrifice in the service of our fatherland. They are heroes of our democracy. We offer our heartfelt prayers and condolences in respect of all those who lost their lives.

17. In the days ahead, those of us that you have elected to serve must show that we are men and women with the patriotism and passion, to match the hopes and aspirations of you, the great people of this country. We must demonstrate the leadership, statesmanship, vision, capacity, and sacrifice, to transform our nation. We must strengthen common grounds, develop new areas of understanding and collaboration, and seek fresh ideas that will enrich our national consensus.

18. It is the supreme task of this generation to give hope to the hopeless, strength to the weak and protection to the defenceless.

19. Fellow citizens, the leadership we have pledged is decidedly transformative. The transformation will be achieved in all the critical sectors, by harnessing the creative energies of our people.

20. We must grow the economy, create jobs, and generate enduring happiness for our people. I have great confidence in the ability of Nigerians to transform this country. The urgent task of my administration is to provide a suitable environment, for productive activities to flourish. I therefore call on the good people of Nigeria, to enlist as agents of this great transformation.

21. My dear countrymen and women, being a Nigerian is a blessing. It is also a great responsibility. We must make a vow that, together, we will make the Nigerian Enterprise thrive.

22. The leadership and the followership must strive to convert our vast human and natural resources into the force that leads to a greater Nigeria. The Nigeria of our dreams must be built on hard work and not on short cuts. Let me salute the Nigerian workers who build our communities, cities and country. They deserve fair rewards, and so do the women that raise our children, and the rural dwellers that grow our food.

23. The moment is right. The signs are heart-warming. We are ready to take off on the path of sustained growth and economic development. In our economic strategy, there will be appropriate policy support to the real sector of the economy, so that Small and Medium Enterprises may thrive. Nigeria is blessed with enormous natural wealth, and my Administration will continue to encourage locally owned enterprises to take advantage of our resources in growing the domestic economy. A robust private sector is vital to providing jobs for our rapidly expanding population. But this must be a collaborative effort.

24. We must form technical and financial partnerships with global businesses and organizations. We live in an age where no country can survive on its own; countries depend on each other for economic well-being. Nigeria is no different. Returns on investment in Nigeria remain among the highest in the world. We will continue to welcome sustainable investment in our economy.

25. We will push programs and policies that will benefit both local and foreign businesses, but we must emphasize mutual benefits and win-win relationships. The overall ongoing reforms in the banking and financial sectors are therefore designed to support the real sector of the economy.

26. To drive our overall economic vision, the power sector

reform is at the heart of our industrialization strategy. I call on all stakeholders, to cooperate with my administration, to ensure the success of the reforms.

27. Over the next four years, attention will be focused on rebuilding our infrastructure. We will create greater access to quality education and improved health care delivery. We will pay special attention to the agricultural sector, to enable it play its role of ensuring food security and massive job creation for our people.

28. The creation of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority will immensely contribute to strengthening our fiscal framework, by institutionalizing savings of our commodity-related revenues. With this mechanism in place, we will avoid the boom and bust cycles, and mitigate our exposure to oil price volatility.

29. The lesson we have learnt is that the resolution of the Niger Delta issue is crucial for the health of the nation's economy. In the interest of justice, equity and national unity, we shall actively promote the development of the region. I believe that peace is a necessary condition for development.

30. Fellow citizens, in every decision, I shall always place the common good before all else. The bane of corruption shall be met by the overwhelming force of our collective determination, to rid our nation of this scourge. The fight against corruption is a war in which we must all enlist, so that the limited resources of this nation will be used for the growth of our commonwealth.

31. I am confident that we have every reason to look to the future with hope. We owe ourselves and posterity the duty of making this country respectable in the comity of nations. Nigeria, as a responsible member of the international community, will remain committed to the maintenance of global peace and security. We will continue to play an active role in the United Nations. Our role in the African Union, ECOWAS, and the Gulf of Guinea will be enhanced to ensure greater human and energy security.

32. Your Excellencies, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, this is a new dawn for Africa. We fought for decolonization. We will now fight for democratization. Nigeria, in partnership with the African Union, will lead the process for democracy and development in Africa. In particular, we will support the consolidation of democracy, good governance and human rights in the continent. Africa must develop its vast resources to tackle poverty and under-development.

33. Conscious of the negative effect of insecurity on growth and development, my Administration will seek collaboration at bilateral and multilateral levels, to improve our capability in combating trans-border crimes.

In this regard, we will intensify our advocacy against the illicit trades in small arms and light weapons, which have become the catalyst for conflicts on the African continent. All Nigerian diplomatic missions abroad are to accord this vision of defending the dignity of humanity the highest priority.

34. My fellow countrymen and women, Nigeria is not just a land of promise; it shall be a nation where positive change will continue to take place, for the good of our people. The time for lamentation is over. This is the era of transformation. This is the time for action. But Nigeria can only be transformed if we all play our parts with commitment and sincerity. Cynicism and skepticism will not help our journey to greatness. Let us all believe in a new Nigeria. Let us work together to build a great country that we will all be proud of. This is our hour.

35. Fellow Compatriots, lift your gaze towards the horizon. Look ahead and you will see a great future that we can secure with unity, hard work and collective sacrifice.

36. Join me now as we begin the journey of transforming Nigeria.

- I will continue to fight, for your future, because I am one of you.
- I will continue to fight, for improved medical care for all our citizens.

· I will continue to fight for all citizens to have access to first class education.

· I will continue to fight for electricity to be available to all our citizens.

· I will continue to fight for an efficient and affordable public transport system for all our people.

· I will continue to fight for jobs to be created through productive partnerships.

38. I know your pain, because I have been there. Look beyond the hardship you have endured. See a new beginning; a new direction; a new spirit.

39. Nigerians, I want you to start to dream again. What you see in your dreams, we can achieve together. I call upon all the Presidential candidates who contested with me to join hands with us as we begin the transformation of our country.

40. Let us work together; let us build together; let us bequeath a greater Nigeria to the generations to come.

41. I thank you! God bless you all! And God bless the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Introduction by Dr Segun Ige



Reference: Ige, J. O. (2009) 'Rhetoric, Political Transition (s) and Democratic Violences.' In *A/P* Vol 1. 253.

Quotation

When one interrogates issues of place, situation, milieu, and occasion that involve African people as participants, it is important to look for the concept of agency as opposed to dis-agency. We say that one has found dis-agency in every situation where the African is dismissed as a player or actor within his or her own world. I am fundamentally committed to the view that African people must be seen as agents in economic, cultural, political, and social terms. What we can argue about in any intellectual discourse is the degree to which Africans are weak or strong agents, but there should not be any question that agency exists. When agency does not exist we have a condition of marginality, and the worst form of marginality is to be marginal in your own story.

Molefe Kete Ashante (2007: 40-41) *An Afrocentric Manifesto*. Polity Press.

Book Received



Professor Jaap de Jong, Department of Journalism, Leiden University, presented the book, *Bending Opinion: Essays on Persuasion in the Public Domain*, to the African Association for Rhetoric (AAR). This presentation was made on behalf of the Rhetoric Society of Europe. The African Association for Rhetoric is profoundly grateful for this gesture and looks forward to future collaboration with The Rhetoric Society of Europe.

Individuals who may want to join the Rhetoric Society of Europe may contact: Jens E. Kjeldsen or post.eurorhet@gmail.com



Timely Deeds

If you cannot face the Judge,
Don't do it!,
That illegal act;

If you cannot face the mirror,
Dress smart!
That saves you the shame.

If you cannot stand a bad name,
Be noble,
Be virtuous,
That saves you the grief.

We write stories daily;
Daily,
History writes us;
Whether we like it or not,
Written or unwritten,
Posterity will hear about your deeds.

Segun Ige '05



Poetry

Mother. . . the part we share

addressed to Christine

If you asked me to
I could call you by your name;
But, i'd rather call you 'mother',
My mother.

The pains and agonies of life
Mould our mortality,
Strengthen our feeble knees
As they creak and bend in daunting moments.

Mother,
The vase that holds the roses
Sits still; unstilted, unbroken, unruffled,
The flowers may fade
And the leaves wither,
The hole in the pot's head
Forever receives fresh fragrant roses,
Daily. . . the part we share.

The part we share to love
Loving. . .
The part we live to share
Sharing. . .
The part we share to care
Caring. . .
The part we love to share
Sharing 'n caring
The part we share to live. . . to love.
Love that has many faces,
And daily, love is the part we share,
Mother, my mother.

Segun Ige '97

